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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHE HOMER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs 
STEPHEN HOMER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to consider this 
matter is granted pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h) , Utah 
Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This is an appeal of an action for divorce. The granting 
of the divorce, per se, is NOT, inter alia, being appealed. 
However, several but not all issues within the property 
distribution have been appealed. The standard for appellate 
review of such matters is to afford the trial court 
"discretion" and the trial court's judgment will not be 
overturned, absent a showing of "abuse of discretion". 
However, in the instant case, the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to make the required specific 
"findings" necessary to support its judgment. The trial court 
also erred in ignoring the clear weight of uncontrover ted 
evidence. 
This appeal presents the following issues: 
1. May permanent alimony be awarded following a 
short-term marriage when the trial court fails to 
make the requisite factual "findings" concerning 
such alimony award? 
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2. Is it equitable and even "constitutional" to 
award permanent alimony in a contested, "no fault" 
divorce over the objection of the paying ex-spouse? 
3. May a property distribution be supported when 
the trial court fails to make the requisite factual 
"findings" concerning the valuation of the assets 
to be distributed? 
4. Should the date of commencement of the action 
and simultaneous separation of the parties be 
utilized to value "pension" assets which have a 
readily-ascertainable value rather than the date of 
decree, where the Plaintiff to the divorce 
intentionaLly drags out the proceedings so as to 
unjustly maximize her undeserved economic windfall 
from the property distribution? 
5. Should one party be entitled to share in 
retirement account funds intended as a replacement 
for "social, security" benefits when, as a matter of 
federal law, that spouse would not be entitled to 
"social security" benefits based upon the earnings 
of the ex-husband and where the ex-husband will 
suffer a substantial penalty by reason of his 
participation in the alternative retirement 
account? 
6. Should the income tax consequences to the 
parties be considered in making a property 
distribution and in ordering child support, 
7. Should the non-custodial parent be obligated 
to pay "child care expenses" when such are not 
being "actually incurred" as required by statute? 
8. Should a non-custodial parent be given credit 
for "child support" paid to another ex-spouse when 
such is in excess of that actually ordered by a 
court? 
9. Should a step-parent be entitled to an 
"equitable restitution" for the financial 
contributions made during the marriage in raising 
the step-children of the ex-spouse? 
STATUTES WHERE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
There are no statutes, constitutional provisions 
court rules, the interpretation of which would, in itself 
determinative of the issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION, 
This is an action for divorce. This action was commenced 
in September 1987. A non-jury trial was held in July 1989. A 
decree of divorce was entered in October 1989. This partial 
appeal concerning only certain items pertaining to the 
property distribution followed. No cross-appeal was filed. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in August 1980 after a brief 
(33 days) acquaintance. 
At the time of the marriage, the Plaintiff (wife) was 36 
years old, had two children (ages 11 and 12) from a previous 
marriage who resided with her, was a college graduate and was 
gainfully employed at Brigham Young University as a program 
coordinator in the International Students Office. The 
Defendant (husband) was 32 years old, had two children (ages 
7 and 4) from a previous marriage who resided with their 
mother, was a practicing attorney and had obtained employment 
as the City Attorney for West Jordan City. 
One child Melissa now age 9, was born in July 1981 
during the marriage. 
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The "procedural history" of this action is relevant to 
many of the issues raised in this appeal. 
On September 11, 1987, the Plaintiff filed this action 
for divorce. On September 12th the Defendant received, by 
mail, correspondence from Plaintiff's trial counsel (Mr 
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Richard B Johnson!) indicating that the divorce action had 
been filed and directing that he should leave the marital 
home or else court orders would be sought, mandating that 
result. On September 15th the Defendant left the marital 
home. Since the separation of the parties, Plaintiff declined 
all offers of reconciliation OR settlement. 
In October 1987 the Defendant filed an answer to the 
Complaint for Divorce. Later that month the Defendant filed 
"discovery" and served it upon Plaintiff's counsel. 
In November 1987 Plaintiff's counsel responded to the 
Defendant's discovery, answering only part of the discovery 
and moving for a protective order for the remainder. The 
Defendant responded by filing a "Motion to Compel Discovery". 
The- trial court failed to respond to the two Motions. 
In February 1988 the Plaintiff "certified" her readiness 
for trial. The Defendant responded that the "discovery" 
motions were still unresolved. In March 1988 the Defendant 
scheduled a hearing (for March 23, 1988) before the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner on the pending "discovery" motions. 
That hearing was rescheduled to April 1, 1988. 
On March 29, 1988, the Defendant was served with an 
"order to show cause" concerning an alleged failure to make 
the Plaintiff's house payment since November 1987. 
At the April 1 hearing, the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner ordered the Plaintiff to answer parts of the 
Defendant's "discovery" within "thirty days". 
On March 28, 1990, Mr Johnson was suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of six months. The Plaintiff 
has subsequently obtained other counsel for this appeal. 
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 The "house payment" issue is NOT an issue before this Court. 
That portion of the judgment of the trial court was MOT 
appealed by the Defendant, The Plaintiff filed no 
cross-appeal. 
In November 1988 the District Court, acting on its own 
motion, scheduled the matter for trial on February 6, 1990. 
Notice was mailed by the Clerk of the Court to all the 
parties. 
On February 1, 1990 a mere five days before 
tr ial Plaintiff's counsel requested that an appraisal of 
the Defendant's home in West Jordan be made. The Defendant 
vigorously objected to this "last minute" tactic. [From 
essentially "Day #1" in this action the Defendant's position 
was to "wash" the two homes; such was called out in the 
September 15, 1987 letter of the Defendant to Plaintiff's 
counsel. It was assumed that Plaintiff had acquiesced in that 
approach and that the value of the two homes was not going to 
be litigated.] The Plaintiff's counsel obtained, ex parte, a 
continuance of the trial, so that the appraisal could be 
conducted. The trial was rescheduled for May 6, 1990. 
Plaintiff's counsel again never scheduled the appraisal 
of the Defendant's home. Again, on the eve of trial in May 
1989 the issue came up. However, this time the parties agreed 
to "wash" the two houses: the values of the two homes would* 
not be litigated. However, for the May 6th trial, the trial 
judge was unavailable and the trial was again postponed, to 
July 13, 1989. 
On July 13, 1989, trial was held before the Court, 
sitting without a jury. On July 31st the trial court issued a 
two-page "Memorandum Decision". 
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3. The trial court abused its discretion by valuing the 
retirement assets at the time of commencement of the action 
and separation of the parties, particularly when the 
Plaintiff intentionally dragged out this case for her own 
undeserved economic unjust enrichment. 
4. The "Windfall Elimination Provision" of federal law 
should be taken into account as such impacts the property 
settlement, particularly the distribution of the "pension" 
account. 
5. The income tax consequences of the child custody must be 
considered in making an equitable property distribution. 
6. The non-custodial parent's obligation to pay "child care 
expenses", in addition to the basic "child support" award, 
should terminate when the those "child care expenses" are not 
"actually incurred." 
7. Credit should be given for the amounts actually paid as 
"child support" for children of a previous marriage in 
arriving at "child support" to be paid in the instant 
divorce. 
8. Principles of "equitable restitution" [Martinez vs 
Martinez, 754 P.2d 59 (Utah Court of Appeals 1988)] dictate 
that a step-parent who provides significant financial support 
in the raising of the step-children be entitled to some 
consideration of that fact upon dissolution of the marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
It is black-letter law that divorce is an "equitable" 
proceeding and that the divorce court should be a "court of 
equity." In that context, the court should perhaps look a 
little deeper into what is actually happening and has 
happened, so as to arrive at a "fair" result. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS REQUISITE 
TO AN AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY 
The issue of the Plaintiff's entitlement to permanent 
alimony was and is a major point in this litigation: that 
claimed entitlement was and is vigorously challenged by the 
Defendant for reasons of "principle" and for reasons of "lack 
ofactual need" on her part. 
The learned Trial Court's Memorandum Decision (31 July 
1989) [ADDENDUM sat A2] briefly notes: 
"Plaintiff is awarded $150.00 per month as 
alimony." 
No specific findings or reasons for the award are given. That 
31 July 1989 Memorandum Decision directs Plaintiff's Counsel 
to prepare "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law". Such 
were prepared and, eventually (26 October 1989, after 
"objection") signed by the District Court. The "finding" 
[ADDENDUM at A15] with respect to alimony merely states: 
"16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is in 
need of alimony and the Defendant has the ability 
to pay the same and, accordingly, the Defendant is 
ordered . . . " 
In Marchant vs Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1989) and Sampinos vs Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1988), this Court noted that it was 
"reversible error" to fail to enter specific findings 
concerning the issues raised by an alimony award. The trial 
court must make findings on all material issues and those 
findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough 
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach 
its conclusions on each factual issue presented. Sampinos, 
supra. 
In the instant case, the trial court made only the 
briefest of "finding" (singular) on but one issue; the 
remaining considerations were unaddressed. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PERMANENT ALIMONY IN A "NO-FAULT" DIVORCE 
In 1987 the Utah Legislature in conformity with the 
national trend to make divorce more readily 
available adopted a new "ground" for divorce in Utah: 
"irreconcilable differences". Section 30-3-1(3) (h) , Utah 
Code. This Court has recently characterized such "grounds" as 
being "no fault". Haumont vs Haumont, 135 Utah Advance 
Reports 59 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990). In Haumont the 
Court, for the first time, examined the effect of the 1987 
amendment and wrote: 
Because subsection (h) does not set forth a 
specific fault of the defendant, in contrast to 
these other subsections, we can infer that 
subsection (h), unlike the other provisions, is 
intended to be a no-fault provision. Therefore, we 
conclude that no fault need be proven or inferred 
from the operation of subsection (h). 
Id. at 63. Emphasis added. 
The conclusion that "fault" cannot be inferred 
from"irreconcilable differences" within the marriage is 
certainly self-evident. Every marriage has "differences". The 
successful marriages "reconcile" and accept those 
"differences". Indeed, the very covenant of the marriage 
itself is to accept the differences and to agree to become 
and work "as one". [Plaintifffs personal approach, however, 
evidenced in two separate and distinct marriages, is to run 
away from the relationship, rather than dealing with the 
differences.] As noted in Haumont, subsection (h) 
["irreconcilable differences"] was different from the other 
"grounds" for divorce: it was a "no-fault" divorce. 
Is it proper that one party in 
this case, the Defendant to the marriage be ordered to pay 
money to the other party, when it is her UNILATERAL DECISION 
to terminate the marriage and merely upon "grounds" which, in 
essense, are "I have decided that I don't want this 
relationship any more."? 
Such is hardly "equitable". Such an analysis would not 
be supported in a "business" context. There isn't a court in 
the land that, if one "partner" came into court and, contrary 
to the original partnership agreement which contemplated a 
permanent "partnership", asked for a termination of the 
partnership for "differences", would order the non-defaulting 
party to continue to provide financial support for the 
partner who breached the "partnership". 
- i i -
Various theories have been advanced as justification for 
the award of alimony upon divorce. Howver, before those 
reasons can be analyzed, the history of alimony must be 
examined. 
Is an award of "permanent alimony" against a husband who 
is, legally, "without fault", "equitable"? 
Louise B Raggio, formerly chairperson of the Family Law 
Section of the American Bar Association and former governor 
of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, has written: 
"Permanent alimony or maintenance is a relic of a 
time when women lost their property upon marriage, 
had little chance to earn a living outside the 
home, or had no claim to property held in their 
husband's name. It does not fit the social, 
economic, and legal realities of contemporary 
America where every state makes an equitable or 
equal distribution of marital or community property 
upon divorce. Permanent alimony should be rejected 
in all states, as it now is in Texas, as bad social 
and economic policy. 
Section of Family Law, American Bar Association, Alimony 
(1988), at p. 34. Emphasis added. 
In the instant litigation, the District Court ignored 
the undisputed facts which were before it: the Plaintiff has 
a COLLEGE DEGREE, with a teaching certificate; was presently 
gainfully EMPLOYEED, earns more than $20,000 per year, and 
for the almost two years during which this action was pending 
supported herself on her substantial earnings. 
The Plaintiff lives in the home of her choosing a home 
she purchased PRIOR to the marriage and a home she, for seven 
years during the marriage, refused to move from. She is 
entitled to full "benefits" with her employment: medical, 
health and accident insurance with her employer, sick leave, 
and retirement. She began working full-time for Orem City in 
January 1987 and will, prior to her reaching age 65 (the 
normal "retirement age" contemplated under the Utah State 
Retirement System, in which her employer participates), be 
fully "vested" in that program and have more than the "twenty 
years" required for full "retirement" under the state 
retirement system. She is not "underemployed" in a low-paying 
position accepted out of desparation; on the contrary, 
she as a librarian is in exactly the job she had been 
seeking for years. [See her personal resume1, EXHIBIT 
#25; ADDENDUM #7 at A-49.] 
Additionally, the District Court failed to take into 
account the sizable property settlement effected by the 
Court's division of the Defendant's pension account: she is 
entitled to receive NOW in excess of $60,000 cash, to do with 
as she pleases. She can spend it; she can invest it. At 8% 
simple interest, that $60,000 would earn more than $4,800 per 
year THREE TIMES the amount she testified she "needed" to 
maintain the "standard of living" she became accustomed to 
during the marriage. [TRANSCRIPT at p. 50.] Indeed, that 
singular reference was the only justification as to any 
"need" for alimony. 
But the dispute here is more than just THE MONEY. The 
dispute is one of "principle". It is patently unfair in the 
absence of any kind of judicial ("due process"?) 
determination as to "fault" which might be foreseeable and 
thus, preventable to mandate that the party who has acted 
consistent with the "partnership" originally contemplated 
should now pay the "defaulting party". In addition to the 
patent unfairness, such an approach borders on being 
"unconstitutional". [That may, at first blush, appear to be a 
novel idea. But the Court must remember that we are dealing 
with a new statute, which is only three years old. That issue 
(of unconstitutionality) has ever been raised before in 
previous appeals to the Court. Indeed, the idea of "alimony" 
has never been thoroughly addressed in the context of the new 
"ground" ("irreconcilable differences") for divorce. Haumont 
peripherally addressed it in dicta, only to ultimately remand 
the case for additional findings.] The unconstitutionality of 
the alimony award arises, at least in this case, for any of 
three reasons: a "taking" of private property for a "public 
purpose" without just compensation, a denial of "equal 
protection", and an "impairment of contractual obligations". 
One of the justifications advanced in previous judicial 
decisions of Utah for an award of alimony is to keep the 
receiving spouse from "becoming a public charge." While such 
may have once been a laudable reason, times have changed. 
Women now constitute a sizable element of the work force; 
economic oppo c tun i t ies are open to women like never before. 
58% of graduating class at the University of Utah law school 
are women; 34% of the graduates of the U of U medical school 
are women. 46% of the accounting graduates at the U of U are 
women. Deseret News, "Utah Professional women gain 
ground and numbers", November 30, 1989, p. 18B. Indeed, 
even the Plaintiff herself contemplated going to "law school" 
following her first divorce. And that plaintiff's appellate 
counsel is a woman typifies the professional opportunities 
available to women today. 
The unconsitutionality arises when a "private citizen" 
must then make the payments under governmental decree 
(court order) for the "public purpose" of providing for his 
ex-spouse so government won't have to. That certainlylooks 
like a "public purpose". Why should one "class" of citizens 
(ala divorced men, whose ex-spouses claim alimony) be 
obligated to pay (ostensibly for this "public" purpose) when 
others (married men and those whose wives don't claim or 
aren't awarded alimony) have no such duty? Is the fact that 
the spouse who is calling things "quits" has unilaterally 
decided there are "irreconcilable differences" within the 
marriage, which should be judicially decreed to be ended, 
sufficient justification to ignore these constitutional 
prohibitions? 
For the ex-husband (in only some, but not all, cases, as 
numerous women "waive"3 their claim to alimony) to have to 
pay particularly when the supposed "public charge" element 
is sometime in the hypothetical future is inequitable and 
illogical. If the Plaintiff were to walk into the "welfare 
office" and state: "I have a college degree, a job at which I 
earn in excess of $20,000 per year and have full medical 
insurance and retirement benefits, $60,000 in the bank from 
Indeed, the Plaintiff in her previous divorce "waived" 
alimony. In that case, having personally invested in 
her ex-husband's professional career and having not one, but 
TWO, children at an age YOUNGER than the instant parties' 
single child she did not claim alimony. 
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my ex-husband's retirement program and I have no significant 
mental, emotional or physical problems, but I would like to 
receive welfare!" She'd be laughed outside in a secondl 
The fact that only ex-husbands of a small "class" of 
ex-wives have this "legislative obligation" violates the 
"taking" clauses of the United States and the Utah 
constitutions. See Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 
US , 107 S Ct 3141 (1987) and Colman vs Utah State 
Land Board, 132 Utah Advance Reports 3 (Utah Supreme Court 
1990) for a discussion of the "taking" clauses of the state 
and national constitutions. If government is prohibited from 
taking outright a citizen's private property merely because 
government feels it needs that property, shouldn't government 
be similarly prevent (even through the court process) of 
similarly "taking" that private "property" (ala alimony 
payments) in the context of an ostensibly "public purpose" 
(to keep the ex-wife from becoming a "public charge")? 
Why do courts only award alimony to women? Originally, 
court decisions were clear that alimony was awarded to the 
"ex-wife" . The written court decisions made it clear that 
ONLY ex-wives received alimony. The decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Orr vs Orr, 440 US 268 (1979), 
invalidated state legislation which was so facially in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The fact that the 
Legislature has "sterilized" the statute and the courts have 
"sterilized" their opinions so delete all reference to 
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obvious gender-based criteria does not change the effect. 
If the practical effect of the gender-neutral statute arrives 
at an unconstitutional result, the statute is still invalid. 
Why are ex-husbands are never awarded alimony? In the 
instant case, the Defendant asked (in his counterclaim) for 
an equitable property settlement. Yet the trial court didn't 
even think twice about awarding alimony (even in a nominal 
amount of $1 per year, "just in case . . ." Might not the 
Defendant even though he is presently able to work and 
certainly doesn't NOW meet the "welfare guidelines" become 
disabled, unemployed or otherwise unable to support himself? 
In such a situation, should not the ex-wife be obligated to 
"support" her ex-husband particularly when that ex-husband 
was so willing to share his. economic fortunes (acquired 
primarily as the result of personal investments he made in 
his professional education PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE) with her 
for seven years? Or are men not allowed under our laws to 
ever be "public charges"? [If that is the case, then the 
facial "equal protection" violation is established, without 
even looking at the as applied violation.] 
The discriminatory, gender-based approach in which 
alimony was originally developed and in which continues to be 
implemented is shown from the language of court decisions. 
For example, in English vs English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), 
an oft-cited case concerning alimony-issues, the Utah Supreme 
Court was unashamed in stating: 
. . .[T]he most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible 
at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge. 
Id. at 411. Emphasis added. The Court continued by stating 
that the trial court should consider: 
. . . the financial condition and needs of the 
wife, the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself, and the ability of 
the husband to provide support. 
Id. at 411-412. Emphasis added. 
Although the judicial decisions are now more careful to 
not describe "alimony" in such gender-discriminatory terms, 
the practical effect of the standard remains unchanged: there 
is NOT ONE RECORDED APPELLATE DECISION approving of an award 
of alimony to an able-bodied, employed MAN, against the 
wishes of the ex-wifei 
And if the "public charge" element of the alimony "test" 
is so significant (as to authorize its award contrary to the 
objection of the soon-to-be ex-husband and in contravention 
of the constitutional prescriptions), why then do judges 
routinely in a large number of cases enter decrees in 
which alimony IS WAIVED BY THE EX-WIFE? Should not the judge 
take into account the obvious "needs" of the State (so as to 
pay as little out in "welfare" as possible) and award alimony 
in every case? Or would that be too blatantly 
"unconstitutional"? 
And if the "public charge" issue is so overriding, why 
is not the State (or the County or whoever administers the 
"welfare" payments) interpleaded as a "real 
par ty-in-interest" on every divorce action? For both parties 
to the marriage? It certainly isn't fair to prematurely 
conclude that merely because the ex-husband is NOW working 
that he will never be a candidate for "welfare". So what will 
be the standards for awarding ex-husbands alimony even in 
nominal amounts to insure against that future contingency 
that they, too, not become "public charges"? 
And when a woman seeks a divorce and is willing to 
"waive" alimony, shouldn't the trial court "as a matter of 
law" be required to interplead the State, so as to insure the 
"State's interests" (ala that she "not become a public 
charge") are adequately protected? 
It's very fashionable (and even scholarly) for judges to 
attempt to define and refine legal theories justifying an 
award of alimony. And judges might even feel justified 
"judging", based upon their own experience, within their own 
marriages. They might think that their wife (or husband, if a 
female judge) would be entitled to "alimony" if there were 
ever a divorce, because that spouse was such a supportive, 
understanding, loving spouse they would be "entitled" to it. 
The flaw in that logic (of assuming that all marriages or the 
marriage partner before the court is like the judge's 
marriage partner) is obvious: every marriage and every 
marriage partner is different. And whereas the judge might 
have a great marriage, the parties before the court probably 
didn't or so at least one of them thought, or they wouldn't 
be in divorce court. 
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The Legislature has simply said: if she wants "out" (of 
the marriage), she doesn't even need a reason. And the court 
must grant the divorce. 
And the judges have lots of "case law" to cite from. But 
from a practical standpoint, we "legally" have (from the 
Legislature) a situation in which the one marriage "partner" 
is saying "I don't want to be a partner. It's over. I am 
unwilling to continue with the partnership." But then that 
spouse selfishly says: "BUT HE MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ME!" 
Divorce is supposed to be an "equitable" proceeding: a 
proceeding of "equity". A proceeding in which "conscience" 
and "doing what is right because it is right" takes 
precedence over perhaps what "the law" demands. In this 
regard, each judge ought to ask himself: "How would I feel if 
my marriage partner unilaterally just called it quits? Would 
I want to be obligated to pay her money irrespective of her 
"need" AFTER she had terminated the marital "partnership"? 
[It begs the question to say: "Oh, my spouse would never do 
that." Perhaps not. But the judge should put himself in that 
frame of mind. If that .were done, the judicial decisions 
concerning alimony would be a whole lot different.] Such an 
"enlightened" view of alimony and its generally misguided 
history, from a jurist "who has been there", is contained in 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Shepherd of the Idaho 
Supreme Court in the case of Olsen vs Olsen, 557 P.2d 604 
(Idaho 1976). That dissenting opinion is cited for the 
proposition that the judge contrary to the experience of 
most judges who have never experienced first-hand an 
-?n-
unsupportive spouse and an involuntary, contested 
divorce knows what he's talking about.4 The fact that his 
opinion is only a dissenting opinion, even in the minority, 
doesn't mean that he's wrong! And his analysis is that even 
more relevant in our enlightened 1990s, when the Legislature 
has even framed the "grounds" to be "no fault". 
Clearly, an award of permanent alimony in a "no fault" 
divorce raises serious constitutional and "equitable" 
questions. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO VALUE 
THE PENSION ASSETS ON THE DATE OF SEPARATION 
THUS IMPROPERLY REWARDING PLAINTIFF FOR THE 
UNREASONABLE DELAY IN BRINGING THIS CASE TO TRIAL 
This action was commenced on September 11, 1987. Four 
days later the Defendaat was involuntarily (under threat of 
court order) removed from the marital residence. On that 
date, the Plaintiff in fact and even "in law" ended the 
marriage. There were no efforts on her part at effecting a 
reconciliation or even a settlement in the litigation. 
From the very beginning of this litigation, it was 
obvious that the divorce was Plaintiff's unilateral idea and 
that she would be the "moving party". The Defendant's 
September 15th letter to Plaintiff's counsel which letter 
was made a part of the "record" as it related to the "house 
4 Justice Shepard apparently was the involuntary participant 
in a divorce action, which coincidentally was decided by the 
Idaho Supreme Court prior to his assumption of judicial 
duties. See Shepard vs Shepard, 497 P.2d 321 (Idaho 1972). 
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payment" issue which is not before this Court made it clear 
his attempts to "reconcile" the marital differences with the 
Plaintiff. 
Although the Plaintiff's discovery was answered by the 
Defendant in late October 1987, the Plaintiff did nothing. It 
was not until February 1988 that the Plaintiff having 
chosen to ignore major portions of the Defendant's 
"discovery", which the Commissioner later found to be 
relevant filed a certificate of readiness for trial. It 
wasn't until early June that the Plaintiff eventually 
answered that "discovery", which answers where thirty days 
overdue from what the Commissioner had ordered (that the 
discovery be answered by May 1) . 
Rather than proceeding to the trial if there was to be 
one Plaintiff's counsel unsuccessfully pursued the "show 
cause" hearing on the claimed "stipulation" concerning the 
house payment. 
The August 12th (1988) pre-trial conference was 
cancelled at the request of Plaintiff's counsel. 
When the trial was eventually scheduled (November 1988) 
for February 6, 1989 Plaintiff's counsel came in obtained 
ex parte, literally on the "eve of trial" (February 1, 1989) 
a postponement of the trial so he could have an appraisal 
made of the Defendant's home in West Jordan. That 
postponement was effected over the objections of the 
Defendant. 
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But the appraisal was never undertaken. On the eve of 
the assumed trial date (May 1989), Plaintiff's counsel 
stipulated to "wash" the value of the two homes.5 However, on 
that second date the trial judge was nowhere to be found and 
the case was postponed for trial again. 
The second major issue in the litigation, particularly 
the longer the Plaintiff dragged it on, was the valuation of 
the pension accounts held by the Defendant through his 
employment with West Jordan City. 
Briefly, those accounts are much like an I.R.A. account. 
Deposits are made to them by the Defendant and by his 
employer on a monthly basis. Those deposits are based upon a 
percentage of his salary and once deposited, those amounts 
are subject to the specific conditions of the pension 
plans "immediately vested" (much like an I.R.A. account). 
The monthly contributions to those pension and retirement 
accounts is not insubstantial: approximately $1000 per month 
was contributed. Thus, (assuming she was entitled to 
"one-half" of whatever might be contributed) it was to the 
Plaintiff's economic benefit to drag on this litigation as 
long as possible. Her counsel realized this, too, and so he 
5 The March 1, 1990 appraisal undertaken at Defendant's 
request by Gary R Free, M.A.I, appraiser located in Midvale, 
indicated the value of the West Jordan home purchased the 
year prior to separation of the parties to be 
$68,000.00. The existing mortgage on the home at the time 
was more than the appraised value. There was ZERO EQUITY in 
the home. That is to be contrasted with the undisclosed 
appraisal which Plaintiff's counsel never did give to 
Defendant's counsel of the Orem house (purchased by the 
Plaintiff in 1979, less than one year before the instant 
marriage and to which had been made numerous improvements, 
in addition to the mortgage payments which had been made 
during the seven years the parties were together). 
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did. What generally takes three or four months TOOK TWO 
YEARS! And for every month longer that it took, it was 
claimed to be $500+ to the Plaintiff's advantage. Finally, 
the Court on its own motion set the first trial date 
for February 1989. 
And yet the Plaintiff now claims entitlement to those 
"post-filing contributions" (that is, those contributions 
made to the retirement accounts after the date of the filing 
the divorce action). Such is patently unfair. It's illogical. 
And, in this case, such should not be allowed to improperly 
reward the Plaintiff for such dilatory procedure. 
Normally, property in a divorce is valued "at the time 
of the divorce". However, an exception should be made. 
First, when one understands the rule, it doesn't (or 
shouldn't) apply here. The rule was made for the convenience 
of the court, in adjudicating the property settlement. It was 
difficult enough to appraise the value of something, let 
alone appraise its value at some distant time in the past. 
Thus, when adjudicating the value of the marital home or farm 
or one spouse's business, it made sense to value the home at 
the time of the trial. It would have been simply too 
difficult, too speculative to value it at a distant time. 
Secondly, in most divorces, the valuation was all that 
significant anyway: the couple of months or so that the 
divorce was in progress would not likely vary significantly 
the value at issue. 
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Those two reasons for the "rule", however, must be 
contrasted with the instant situation. We are here dealing 
with a valuation of accounts much like a passbook savings 
account the exact value of which can be determined on any 
given date. Furthermore, we are dealing here with accounts 
which increase in value not just be simple appreciation of 
what was accumulated during the marriage, but by 
contributions from the earnings made AFTER the Plaintiff had 
terminated the marital "partnership". As noted, those monthly 
contributions are significant: over $1000 per month. 
Is there reason for such entitlement to those 
"post-filing" contributions? Absolutely not. If the Defendant 
had in lieu of making those contributions simply spent 
the money on some non-visible expenditure she wouldn't have 
any claim to make. 
Should she be entitled to receive a share of those 
contributions because she was continuing to be a "strongly 
supportive marital partner", advancing the continued 
interests of the "partnership"? Absolutely not! She had FILED 
FOR DIVORCE and had kicked her husband out! This wasn't just 
a temporary marital disagreement; she was pulling out all the 
stops. And this Court should not be swayed by Kathe's 
assertions that this is a "nine-year" or "ten-year" marriage; 
the marriage ended at SEVEN YEARS when she filed for divorce! 
Would she be entitled to those contributions because she 
was adhering to the agreed-upon concepts of "family" and 
togetherness? Absolutely not. Irrespective of what the 
Defendant wanted and irrespective of what the parties' minor 
child wanted (to preserve the "family" relationship), she was 
torpedoing everything. But now that there's money and 
perhaps lots of money she's claiming "entitlement" to a 
portion of the post-filing contributions. 
Would she be entitled to a share of those accounts 
because she was being a supportive "partner", caring about 
the emotional and familial needs and desires of her spouse? 
Let's not be ridiculous! Divorce especially an involuntary 
divorce is one of the most traumatic of all human 
experiences; it is perhaps the most traumatic of those 
experiences which can be voluntarily initiated. One need only 
read the daily newspaper to see the stress that divorce puts 
on individuals, some of whom "crack" under the trauma. 
The September 9, 1987 correspondence from Mr Johnson to 
the Defendant indicates the parties are not to "dissipate" 
the assets acquired during the marriage. To avoid such, a 
court order could be sought. It was mutually "stipulated" (by 
conduct, if not by words) that such a court order would not 
be needed. Indeed, those assets were not dissipated. ON THE 
CONTRARY, additional amounts were contributed. It would be 
interesting to surmise what the trial court's reaction would 
have been had the Defendant dissipated what had been there at 
•separation. Why is it that the court's are bold enough to 
insure that "what's there stay's there" until the time of the 
divorce and would be willing to examine to see if anything 
was taken away during the pendency of the proceedings, but 
yet are unwilling to see what has been ADDED TO since the 
separation? 
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Although the assets are generally valued at the time of 
the divorce decree, the trial court may value the property at 
an earlier date where one party has dissipated an asset, 
hidden its value or otherwise acted obstructively. Peck vs 
Peck 738 P. 2d 1050 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987); Andersen vs 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Court of Appeals 1988). Thus, 
the "valuation rule" is not absolute either in its terms or 
its application! In this case where the Plaintif has 
intentionally delayed these proceedings should she be 
allowed to reap an unearned reward? If the courts are smart 
enough to make equitable adjustments when one party 
"dissipates" a "marital asset" while the divorce proceeding 
is pending, should that court be smart enough to take into 
account the fact that one party increased the value of the 
"marital asset"? 
The Defendant here is not seeking a major revision in 
the "rule" that assets be valued at the time of divorce. In 
most instances, such is proper. Such is easier for the court. 
And generally, due to the nature of the asset (which was 
probably acquired prior to separation) and the abbreviated 
time frame at issue, the "old" general rule is appropriate. 
However, the Defendant is seeking a minor exception to 
the general "rule". That minor exception includes several 
elements: Where there has been (1) significant delay in the 
case and (2) the property to be evaluated is of a kind such 
that the valuation can be made easily and without dispute 
(such as in the case of a defined-contribution pension 
account), the date of the separation of the parties shall be 
the date the valuation is made. 
The Defendant is not attempting to "cut off" the 
Plaintiff from her "fair share" of assets accumulated during 
the supposed "marriage partnership". Nor are we discussing 
increases in value accruing to said assets acquired prior to 
separation. We are talking about readily- and 
exactly-discernible amounts of monies added to those assets 
AFTER the Plaintiff effected a separation of the parties and 
the ultimate demise of the marital partnership. 
There are no Utah cases interpretting "pension" assets 
in this regard. However, numerous other jurisdictions have 
adopted the rule that the "date of commencement of the 
divorce action" should be THE DATE upon which pension 
accounts should be valued. This is especially the rule in the 
more recently-decided cases, which may constitute a judicial 
"trend". See, for example, Savides vs Savides, 508 N.E.2d 617 
(Massachusetts 1987); Berish vs Berish, 432 N.e. 2d 183 (Ohio 
1982); Hunt vs Hunt, 698 P.2d 1168 (Alaska 1985); Schanck vs 
Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986); Nelson vs Nelson, 736 P.2d 
1145 (Alaska 1987); Taylor vs Taylor, 436 N.E.2d 56 (Indiana 
1982); Weaver vs Weaver, 324 S.E.2nd 915 (N.C. App. 1985); 
Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal.App.3d 444, 140 Cal.Rprt. 779 
(Cal. App. 1977); Re Marriage of Halverson, 749 P.2d 518 
(Montana 1988) . 
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The Defendant specifically requested the trial court to 
make "findings" as to the value of the Defendant's retirement 
and pension accounts as of the date of separation (15 
September 1987). The trial court refused to make those 
"findings", even though the evidence was not in dispute. The 
trial court's analysis of the issue is contained within the 
26 October 1989 Memorandum Decision, in which the Trial Judge 
wrote: 
Had the defendant wished to limit the plaintiff's 
interest in payments made to retirement programs 
during the pendency of this litigation, he could 
have moved for a bifurcated proceeding, and could 
have ended the marriage shortly after the action 
was filed. Plaintiff is entitled to a percentage of 
whatever retirement benefits were accrued between 
the time of entry into the marriage, and final 
termination of the marriage through this divorce 
action. 
RECORD at 269. ADDENDUM #2 at A-5] Emphasis added. The trial 
court's approach to this problem is flawed in two 
particulars. 
The more "equitable", logical approach to this problem 
would be: if the Plaintiff wished to be entitled to the 
Defendant's post-filing retirement contributions, she should 
not have filed for divorce and done everything she could to 
terminate the marital "partnership". It is illogical, 
irrational and contrary to good conscience and equity for the 
Plaintiff to file for divorce, kick her husband out of the 
home, deprive him of almost all meaningful relationship with 
the parties' minor child, and at the same time claim that she 
was still "acting as a supportive, participative PARTNER", 
acting in furtherance of the "marital partnership". 
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The trial judge apparently expected the Defendant to 
divine the trial judge's ultimate decision: that if there 
were a "bifurcated hearing" (apparently in which the "divorce 
could be granted" , while the property settlement issues would 
be later adjudicated) , he would have no problem denying the 
Plaintiff the post-filing contributions. Such doesn't make 
sense. It should have been obvious to the trial 
court particularly in light of the lengthy time the 
Plaintiff failed to actively move the case to 
disposition that she had ceased to be a "partner". 
In this same vein, there is absolutely no provision in 
the statute which suggests a "bifurcated hearing" is even 
possible, let alone appropriate. This is particularly the 
situation, where the trial court has "continuing 
jurisdiction" over the property of the parties. Thus, it 
should have made no legal distinction if there had been a 
bifurcated hear ing. 
The trial court had there been such a 
hearing apparently would have had no difficulting in 
valuing the property at the earlier date (the date of the 
"bifurcated hearing"), even though the trial court have been 
perhaps two years later. That fact alone shows that the 
Defendant's suggested approach with respect to valuation of 
defined-contribution "pensions" would be acceptable: that the 
earlier date would be appropriate. 
In actuality, there could be absolutely no problem for 
the trial court, which made a 50-50 split of the pensions. 
The QDRO prepared by Plaintiff's counsel specified a division 
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of the pensions accrued during the marriage through September 
15, 198JK By the simple changing of the "1982" t o a "1982"/ 
the matter could be easily accomplished. The Court wouldnft 
have to calculate the values. The pension plan Administrator 
would, independently, calculate the various amounts to be 
divided among the parties, according to the percentage set by 
the Court. 
The second flaw in the trial court's approach (re: the 
prompt "bifurcated hearing") is that it improperly encourages 
divorce, whereas the "policy" of the State is to encourage 
married couples to stay together. The trial court's approach 
encourages the defendant to quickly become "divorced" (via 
the "bifurcated hearing". Otherwise, he risks the continued 
subsidization of the plaintiff with "retirement" monies when 
it is a matter of public record that she's not planning to 
stick around for. In reality as was the situation in this 
case the defendant might be willing to attempt to reconcile 
things, to save the marriage. Yet the trial court's approach, 
in essence, says: "if she's filed, you'd better quickly get 
it over with." Such is contrary to the expressed legislative 
policy of the State: 
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to 
strengthen the family life foundation of our 
society and reduce the social and economic costs to 
the state resulting from broken homes and to take 
reasonable measures to preserve marriages, 
particularly where minor children are involved. 
Section 30-3-11.1, Utah Code. Emphasis added. 
The trial court's approach and this Court's approach, 
if it affirms the property valuation date issue is contrary 
to that "public policy" purpose. The trial court's approach 
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encourages the party-defendant to also seek the divorce. In 
that setting with both parties actively moving for the 
divorce, particularly if the divorce is granted (at the 
"bifurcated hearing" soon after filing) before all the 
property settlement and other issues are resolved the 
likelihood that the marriage will be "preserved" is 
practically nil. 
If, however, one party (the plaintiff) has to be the 
moving-party, while the other party (the defendant) can 
attempt to reconcile things (by not "lighting fire to his end 
of the bridge"). Thus, the "public policy" of "preserving" 
marriage is served. 
It is unfortunate that in a state where the 
legislatively-expressed "public policy" of the State is to 
preserve marriages^ judicial decisions (as in this case) 
have the practical effect of encouraging divorcel This Court 
should clarify the property-valuation rule with respect to 
defined-contr ibution pensions. 
In reality, the moving-party (Plaintiff) ought not to be 
able to complain. She has unilaterally terminated the 
relationship. Can it be reasonably stated that she (since the 
filing for divorce) was acting consistent with the parties' 
original goals? That she was acting as a "partner"? 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO THE VALUATION 
OF THE RETIREMENT ASSETS IS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
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A major point of the litigation at the trial stage was 
the valuation of the "retirement accounts" : both the amount 
(as far as an "offset" might be concerned) and the date upon 
which to be valued (for "principle" of "equity"). The 
Plaintiff's prepared "findings" failed to address even an 
attempted valuation of the assets. 
The Defendant prepared specific "supplemental findings" 
for the Trial Court's consideration, but these were 
apparently summarily ignored. 
It is almost black-letter law that the trial courts 
failure to make findings as to the value of parties' assets 
in making equitable distribution of property constituted 
reversible error requiring remand for entry of additional 
findings. Carlton vs Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah Court of 
Appeals,"1988); Peck vs Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah Court of 
Appeals, 1987). The reason for this requirement is to allow 
the appellate court meaningful review of the trial court's 
property distribution. Andersen vs Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1988). In Andersen, the trial court, 
"without placing a value on the IRA account", "awarded 
plaintiff one-half of the account to each party." This Court 
reversed and remanded for further findings. 
In the instant case, the failure to make specific 
findings was not the result of the complaining party's own 
draftsmanship. Boyle vs Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1987). On the contrary, those proposed "supplemental 
findings" strictly conformed to the evidence. Indeed, the 
trial court characterized them as "an attempt by the 
defendant to relitigate the case.11 (Memorandum Decision of 26 
October 1989; ADDENDUM #2 at A-4.] The "supplemental 
findings" proposed by the Defendant were not an "attempt to 
relitigate" the case; rather, such proposed "findings" were 
submitted in the honest belief that the uncontroverted 
evidence supported such "findings". [In that regard, the 
Trial Court's characterization of the proposed "findings" is 
indeed a compliment and recognition of their accuracy and 
thoroughness. ] 
The trial court doesn't have "discretion" to refuse to 
enter "findings", particularly when such are expressly 
requested, merely because such appear to be unnecessary for 
the trial court's determination. The critical test in this 
situation is whether such "findings" were supported by the 
competent, uncontrover ted evidence; the Defendant submits 
that those "findings" were so supported. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO EQUITABLY 
CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE "WINDFALL ELIMINATION 
PROVISION" OF FEDERAL LAW, AS IT AFFECTS 
THE DEFENDANT'S "PENSION" ACCOUNT 
In 1982 the Defendant's employer [West Jordan City] 
withdrew from the federal Social Security System and 
established an alternative, defined-contribution pension plan 
for its employees. This plan to which the contribution 
rates are essentially what those contribution rates would 
have been to the federal Social Security System is called 
the "Pension" account, to distinguish it from a separate, but 
similar account called the "Retirement Account" (which 
contained contributions in lieu of those made to the Utah 
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State Retirement System for city employees) . The "Pension 
account" represents the replacement for social security. See 
EXHIBITS # 19 and 20 [ADDENDA #8 and #9 at A50-A54.] 
However, because the Defendant is entitled to 
retirement-type benefits under the West Jordan City plans 
based on earnings which are not "covered" by federal Social 
Security, the "Windfall Elimination Provision" of federal law 
comes into play. That provision provides from a significant 
reduction in the monthly benefit the Defendant is to receive 
from social security based upon his lifetime earnings from 
other than West Jordan City. That reduction may be as much as 
"50 percent" of the "basic benefit" provided by Social 
Security. The "Windfall Elimination Provision" was 
specifically promulgated by Congress, to penalize employees 
of state and local governments which were not required to be 
participants in the federal Social Security System. 
The specific workings of the "Windfall Elimination 
Provion" of federal law were explained by a witness at trial, 
Mr Randy Marchant of the Provo office of the Social Security 
Administration, as contained in the TRANSCRIPT at pages 86 
through 91. [ADDENDA # 13 at A64-A69.] 
Under the provisions of Section 216(d) of Title 42 of 
the United States Code [the Social Security Act]6, the 
Plaintiff would not be entitled to an Social Security 
(surviving divorced spouse) benefits based upon the earnings 
6 Section 416(d) of the Social Security Act provides, in part: 
(1) The term "divorced wife" means a woman divorced from an 
individual, but only if she had been married to such 
individual for a period of 10 years before the date the 
divorce became effective. 
. . . 
of the Defendant because she was not married the "10 years" 
stipulated by federal statute. Thus, she accrued during the 
marriage no benefits from Social Security, as she 
unilaterally chose to "bail out" before the stipulated time. 
The fact that the Defendant's employer has established the 
alternative "Pension Account" (in lieu of Social Security) 
has thus not harmed her in any way. 
If it were simply a matter of splitting the "Pension 
Account", it would be easy. But the "Windfall Elimination 
Provision" complicates things: that Provision imposes a 
substantial penalty upon the Defendant but not upon the 
Plaintiff because of his participation in the alternative 
("Pension") system. His Social Security benefits will be 
significantly reduced; hers will be unaffected. 
Because she (per federal statute) loses nothing with 
respect to Social Security by his participation in the 
"Pension" account and because he is penalized substantially 
by the "Windfall Elimination Provision", the "Pension 
Account" should not be shared with her. It is "inequitable" 
to grant her a "windfall" which .she would otherwise not be 
entitled to anything, as a matter of federal law, while at 
the same time imposing the substantial "penalty" upon him 
through the Windfall Elimination Provision. 
The trial court's handling of this issue was, as 
explained in its Memorandum Decision, apparently as follows: 
that there was no statute cited which prevented such 
d iv is ion. The Defendant concedes that there is "no statute" 
preventing the division of the "Pension Account." Indeed, the 
Pension Account would normally be characterized as "within 
the marital estate". The issue, however, is not whether there 
is a statute which prohibits the division; rather, the issue 
is one of "equity". It is, as a matter of law, inequitable to 
give her an undeserved windfall when he is subjected to the 
substantial penalty (through operation of the Windfall 
Elimination Provision). In this situation, the trial court 
"abused" the "discretion" granted to it either by ignoring 
the evidence which was clearly before it and/or by looking 
for a "statute prohibiting the division", which was not the 
issue at all! 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
"INCOME TAX" CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
The trial court went strictly by the statutory child 
support guidelines [contained in Section 78-45-7.1, Utah 
Code]. The trial court failed to take into account the 
"income tax" consequences to the parties. TRANSCRIPT at p. 
160. 
Although the statutory guidelines claim to take into 
account "income tax" considerations, such is not so. The 
support guidelines are, on their face, "custody-neutral": 
each party "pays" (theoretically, at least) a proportionate 
"share" based strictly upon the individual earnings. 
However, the "custody" plays an important tax 
consequence. Under federal law [Section 152(e)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Title 26 of the United States 
Code)] , the divorced taxpayer having "custody" of the minor 
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dependent chiLd is entitled to claim the income tax exemption 
for that minor child, unless the custodial parent executes a 
federal form allowing the non-custodial parent to claim the 
"exemption". That "exemption" is worth $2000 (federal) and 
$1450 (state) in decreased "income" attributable to the 
taxpaying parent. 
In the instant case, the "marginal tax rate" for the 
parties is 28% (federal) and 7.35% (state). Thus, whichever 
party is granted "custody" (for purposes of the income tax 
"exemption") is granted a diminished tax Liability of $560 
(federal) and $106.57 (state) , for an approximate total of 
$666. If the ex-husband is entitled to claim the "exemption", 
his tax liability is decreased by the $666; if the ex-wife is 
entitled to claim the "exemption", her tax liability is 
decreased by the $666. The Internal Revenue Service and the 
State Tax Commission do not care which of the two taxpayers 
claim the "exemption"; their concern is that only one of 
them is entitled to claim the "exemption". 
In the instant case, the trial court failed to take into 
account the income tax consequences to the parties. The trial 
court blindly followed the guidelines and made no adjustment 
for the tax consequences arising from the custody of Melissa. 
Under federal law (and state law "tracks" federal law on 
this point), a non-custodial parent is entitled to claim the 
"exemption" if that parent provides at least $1200 per year 
for support of the child. In the instant case, the Defendant 
provides FOUR TIMES THAT AMOUNT ($404.95 per month, for a 
total of over $4850 per year)! [Even if the "child care" 
portion of that is not considered as "support11 going to the 
child, the amount contributed ($351.75 per month, for a total 
of over $4200 per year) by the Defendant is over THREE AND 
ONE-HALF TIMES THE FEDERAL MINIMUM for entitlement to the 
"exemption" . ] 
The Plaintiff, because she has "custody" and no Section 
152 "declaration" was executed, is entitled to pay the $666 
less in taxes each year. In fact, the Plaintiff is 
additionally benefited under the tax laws (at least, federal) 
by having entitlement to the "exemption" because she can 
claim a preferential tax rate (i.e. "Head of Household", as 
contrasted with "Single", taxpayer status). 
In Motes vs Motes, 121 Utah Advance Reports 50 (Court of 
Appeals 1989), this Court noted that 
"State divorce courts must always recognize the 
financial benefit accompanying dependency exemption 
when awarding alimony and child support." 
121 Utah Advance Reports at 54. Emphasis added. 
In this case, the trial court failed to do that. The 
trial court simply followed the custody-neutral guidelines. 
In Motes this Court went so far as to approve the trial 
court's order that the custodial parent to execute the 
Section 152 "declaration", granting to the non-custodial 
ex-husband the right to claim the "exemption". Such was not 
specifically asked for in this case; what was asked for was 
for the trial court to take into account those "tax 
consequences" and equitably reduce the amount of monthly 
child support. Such would be "equitable" to both parties and 
would allow the parties (especially the Plaintiff) the 
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preferential taxpayer status (i.e. Head of Household). If the 
Court is unwilling to mandate that kind of tailor-made 
"equitable" result, then the Decree should provide that the 
Defendant is entitled to the "exemption". He IS PAYING three 
and one-half times the federal "minimum" to be entitled to 
it! 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
CHILD SUPPORT ACTUALLY PAID BY THE DEFENDANT 
IN AWARDING CHILD SUPPORT IN THIS DIVORCE 
The Defendant pays child support for two sons from a 
previous marriage. The decree stipulates the amount to be 
$100.00 per month per child, which has been paid. In June 
1987 some three months BEFORE the Plaintiff filed this 
divorce action the Defendant and his former spouse (who 
resided in another state) mutually agreed that the child 
should be raised to $150 per month per child, for a total 
amount of $300.00 per month. That agreement between the 
Defendant and his former spouse was not formalized by a 
modification of the former decree. Nevertheless, the 
Defendant has faithfully paid that amount each month, as 
shown by EXHIBIT # 8; ADDENDUM #10 at A55-A59] 
The Plaintiff asserted that in calculating "child 
support" under the statutory guidelines which would entitle 
the Defendant to a reduction in the amount he would 
pay only the $200.00 amount should actually be utilized, 
and the amount actually paid should be ignored. 
The statute [Section 78-45-7.6(1), Utah Code] provides: 
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As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" 
is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross 
income alimony previously ordered and paid and 
child support previously ordered. 
However, in the instant case, the Defendant actually 
PAID AND CONTINUES TO PAY MORE than what the court ordered in 
the previous divorce. This has been consistently shown for a 
period OVER TWO YEARS. [EXHIBIT # 25; ADDENDUM #10 at 
A55-A59] . [And lest the Court think that unless it is 
actually "ordered", the Defendant might reneg on his 
"promise" to his ex-wife to pay $300, the Court should be 
aware that in the instant situation it is the Plaintiff not 
the Defendant who has the problem in keeping the (marriage) 
"promises" she makes. Nevertheless, the evidence on the part 
of the Defendant is to the contrary: that he will continue to 
honor HIS commitments.] 
It is certainly "inequitable" for the Plaintiff to claim 
that nl AM ENTITLED to be paid $350+ per month for MY CHILD 
(fathered by the Defendant)", while in the same breath 
claiming that the Defendant's former spouse should be 
entitled to "only $100 per child" because that's what the 
previous court "ordered". [That position is 'typical of the 
Plaintiff's selfish attitude in the marriage since 1983, 
which selfishness was the eventual cause of her filing for 
d ivorce. ] 
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The practical effect of reducing the "adjusted gross income" 
by the $100 is a mere $57. Obviously, $5 isn't much to argue 
over. But it is the principle! As noted, she is selfishly 
claiming every nickel she can get even when such is 
entirely inconsistent (i.e. "J[ get $350+, but she is entitled 
to only $100"). And it is illogical. Her argument (claim) has 
nothing to do with increased expenses for the parties' child. 
Those expenses would be the same whether the court had 
ordered the increased (to $150) or not. Thus, we are arguing 
about a mere technicality: whether there is in existence a 
piece of paper in some unread case file from years ago. If 
there is, then the "support" is reduced by $5; if there 
isn't, then it stays. All irrespective of any actual cost or 
expense in raising the parties' minor child. A mere 
technicality! 
What then will be the "policy" of the State of Utah with 
respect to divorced fathers who pay MORE than ordered by the 
courts? [A rare occurrence, but it does happen, as the 
evidence here shows!] Will those fathers be "penalized" for 
doing so, as the Plaintiff is here seeking? Or must those 
fathers go to court and formalize the situation, with its 
costs and attorney's fees (aggravated in this case by the 
out-of-state status of those other children and their 
mother)? Which costs and attorney's fees merely make the 
courts more dogged, the attorney's richer, and often results 
7
 Per Section 78-45-7.14, the "base combined child support 
obligation (both parents)" for 1 child at $5100 monthly 
income (both parents combined) is $525. If that amount is 
reduced by the $100 to $5000, the monthly amount is $517, of 
which the difference is a mere $8. The portion thereof (67%, 
based on relative incomes) to be paid to her is $5. 
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in "unnecessary depletion of limited family resources" 
(Motes, at 54). Not one penny of those costs would go for the 
benefit of either set of child(ren). 
If this Court wants to "penalize" divorced fathers for 
paying MORE than the court-ordered child support, then it 
should affirm the trial court on this issue. If, however, 
this Court wants to (1) do "equity" in this case, (2) further 
the purposes behind the statute, (3) cut down on unnecessary 
litigation and expense, (4) avoid the "depletion of limited 
family resources", and (5) provide for common sense "judicial 
discretion" in such cases, it should overrule the trial court 
and provide for case law guidance for such future (albeit 
relatively rare) situations. 
VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING 
THE PAYMENT OF "CHILD CARE EXPENSES" TO EXTEND 
BEYOND THE TIME WHEN THOSE EXPENSES WILL BE INCURRED 
The Plaintiff testified [TRANSCRIPT at 60-61; ADDENDUM 
#12 at A61-A63] at trial in July 1989 that she incurred "$140 
per month" in child-care expenses so she could work. But she 
also admitted that she "didn't keep any receipts" and that 
the $140 amount was her "estimate" of the expense based on 
the number of hours she was away from home. At the time the 
parties minor child (Melissa) was age 8. Now Melissa is age 9 
and has a continually decreasing need for "child care". 
In preparing the decree for the Court's signature, 
Plaintiff's counsel "merged" the "child care expenses" with 
the "child support", to arrive at a single amount to be paid 
by the Defendant. The Defendant argued, unsuccessfully, that 
the two amounts should be separate and distinct and that as 
the need for "child care" diminished as the child grew older, 
that portion of the award should terminate. 
The statute [Section 78-4 5-7.17(1), Utah Code], 
provides: 
The need to include child care costs in the child 
support order is presumed if the custodial parent 
is working and actually incurring the child care 
costs. 
Emphasis added. This statute provides insight into the issue: 
"child care" costs are separate from the "child support" and 
should be so characterized. 
Indeed, the child support "worksheet" (forms) prepared 
by the Judicial Counsel, utilized even by Plaintiff's counsel 
in this case, and even "signed" as a "finding" by the trial 
court judge, clearly note with respect to "child care 
expenses": "This amount is owed only when child care costs 
are actually incurred." [ADDENDUM #3 at A21] Emphasis added. 
The Defendant only asked that the decree reflect the 
fact that the obligation to make those "child care" payments 
only last as long as such payments were "actually incurred" 
by the Plaintiff. Such certainly was a reasonable request. 
And such should have been acknowledged by the trial court. 
As it now stands, the decree will provide for the 
payment of "child care" expenses until the child is 18 years 
old! A ridiculous result. Approval of such a result cannot 
be inferred, particularly when the Legislature and the 
Judicial Council utilized the term "actually incurred". 
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An alternative would be to seek a future "modification" 
of the decree. Although such is entirely possible, it 
certainly seems to be wasteful and a "depletion of family 
resources". Motes, supra. Will it be the "policy" of the 
State to thus encourage additional litigation, with its 
resultant expense and continued trauma to the parties? 
Wouldn't it be reasonable to provide that the "child care 
expenses" for Melissa a normal, healthy 
nine-year-old terminate when they are no longer "actually 
incurred"? Such appears to be the essence of the statute; 
such IS the stated "finding" of the "worksheet" form prepared 
by the Judicial Council and even signed by the trial court. 
IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
IN RAISING THE PLAINTIFF'S CHILDREN, AS SUCH 
RELATED TO AN OVERALL EQUITABLE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
Unrebutted evidence [EXHIBIT # 23; TRANSCRIPT at p. 140] 
established that from 1980 through 1985 the Defendant 
contributed in excess of $72,000 for the support of the 
Plaintifffs minor children. [This amount did NOT include 
amounts which would have been paid in the years 1986 and 
1987, before the forced separation was effected by the 
Plaintiff (September 1987).] 
It was the Defendant's position that such expenditures 
should have been taken into consideration in effecting an 
overall equitable property distribution. The Plaintiff 
responded that, pursuant to Section 78-45-4.1, Utah Code, the 
Defendant has a "statutory duty" to "support" those minor 
children. Those provisions are undisputed. In fact, at issue 
here is not whether these is the obligation; THAT LEGAL 
OBLIGATION WAS FULFILLED! Which is the whole point! The 
Defendant did provide the support in an amount of $72,000+. 
To merely look at the "legal" requirement without 
examining the "equitable" argument should not be condoned. It 
is black-letter law that "equity" will override "the law" in 
appropriate cases. Divorce is an "equitable" proceeding and 
equity ought to be done! As noted, the "legal" requirement 
was fulfilled. 
The Court should also examine the provisions of Section 
78-45-4, Utah Code: "Every woman shall support her child; . . 
." Emphasis added. The obvious thrust of that statute implies 
"financial and monetary support", not just "emotional" 
support. 
Furthermore, Section 78-45-4.2 clearly states: 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the 
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary 
obligation of support; . . . 
Emphasis added. Thus, it appears as a matter of "statutory 
duty" that the "natural parent" has the "primary obligation" 
for support. 
In the instant case (from 1980 to 1985) the Plaintiff 
provided absolutely "no support" for those two minor 
children. Within a month of the parties' marriage she had 
quit her job and stayed home. [Although arrangement that was 
acquiesced in by the Defendant as he couldn't make her 
work during the early years of the marriage, that 
arrangement was not acceptable to the Defendant for the later 
years of the marriage (post-September 1983), when the 
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Plaintiff was utilizing the marriage strictly as a sham for 
her own unjust economic enrichment. 
Although it was her "primary duty" to do so, she failed to 
"support" her children. [Even the $115 per child per month 
she received all those years as "child support" from her 
previous husband was NOT (since 1981) put into a "family" 
account, but rather was hidden away by her, ostensibly for 
the claimed purpose of "college" for her boys. 
And did the Plaintiff provide any "support" for the 
Defendant's children from a previous marriage? Absolutely NOT 
ONE SINGLE PENNY! 
And from early on in the marriage she claimed that "we 
were going to get a divorce [when Melissa is six (1987)]" and 
was even willing to tell others (starting in 1984) of that 
intended result. [See Testimony of Linda Homer, TRANSCRIPT at 
165-166; ADDENDUM #14 at A70-A72.] Kathe fulfilled her own 
prediction with a margin of error of but seven short weeks! 
And the day after her youngest son turns 18 when the 
Defendant's "statutory duty" theoretically ended she then 
files for divorce. And then claims that the financial 
contribution made by the Defendant should not be 
considered that it was merely "statutory duty"! Such is 
certainly "inequitable"! 
The "snapshot" approach by which the court merely 
examines the parties as they "cross the (marriage) finish 
line" was rejected by this Court in cases such as Martinez 
vs Martinez, 754 P.2d 59 (Utah Court of Appeals 1988), in 
which this Court concluded it was proper for the trial court 
to take into account the contributions of the wife in 
providing support for her husband as he advanced his 
professional degree. If such was appropriate basis for an 
award of "equitable restitution alimony" , to compensate her 
for the time and effort she made in raising the family and 
assisting her husband. 
In the instant case his professional education and 
employment were obtained PRIOR TO the marriage! For seven 
years she and her two sons were the recipient of his 
investment in himself and his efforts. However, now that she 
has chosen to unilaterally end that relationship, the big 
picture ought to be looked at. As noted, a "snapshot photo at 
the finish line" is not sufficient to achieve the equities 
necessary. 
And since the idea of "alimony" even in the context of 
"equitable restitution" is not reasonably available in this 
case, the only asset to be divided is the Defendant's pension 
accounts. 
Up to the time of separation (September 1987) , the 
amounts contributed^ by the Defendant to the various 
retirement accounts was: 
"Pension" (replaces Social Security) $26,634.79 
"Retirement" (replaces Utah State RS) 30,398.27 
ICMA "deferred compensation" 17,956.33 
Individual Retirement Account 6,390.00 
The trial court's refusal to make a specific finding, even 
when expressly requested, arguably complicates this issue. 
However, with respect to the specific values at any given 
time, there is generally no dispute. Those values can be 
precisely determined. 
Those total to approximately $80,000. Assuming that Kathe 
were entitled to "one-half" of the total (and that assumption 
doesn't take into account the "Windfall Elimination 
Provision" penalty which impacts Stephen) due Kathe would be 
about $40,000. The amount spent on HER CHILDREN is TWICE AS 
MUCH. Surely an "equitable restitution" analysis should be 
given, so as to compensate him for the financial sacrifices 
he made for her. A "photo finish" analysis merely at the end 
of the race is NOT the appropriate method of property 
settlement. Martinez, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has consistently held that it is "reversible 
error" for the trial court to fail to make detailed, 
specific findings on all of the factors pertinent to an award 
of permanent alimony. In this case, the trial court's 
singular, limited finding is insufficient to justify an 
award of permanent alimony; the case should be remanded for 
the entry of additional findings. 
It is "inequitable" and unconstitutional for the court 
to order the payment of permanent alimony for a 
short-duration marriage when the grounds for divorce are "no 
fault". 
It is "reversible error" for the trial court to make 
findings as to the value of the parties' assets. The case 
should be remanded for the entry of such additional findings 
as should have been made. 
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The Court should not reward the Plaintiff (and her 
counsel) for the dilatory tactic of failing to promptly move 
this litigation to conclusion. The retirement 
accounts capable of easy and accurate valuation as of the 
date of separation should be valued as of the date of 
separation, not the date the decree was entered. 
This Court should revise the divorce decree, so as to 
provide for the termination of the "child care" when such is 
no longer "actually incurred", as the statute so provides. 
This Court should revise the divorce decree, so as to 
provide for an adjustment to the child support payments based 
upon the child support payments actually paid for other 
children, even though such is more than actually ordered by 
the court in the former divorce action. The decree must take 
into account the "tax consequences" to the parties of the 
custody of the minor child. This Court should declare how the 
principle of "equitable restitution" [Martinez] affects cases 
such as this. 
This litigation has gone on long enough. This Court 
should utilize its inherent powers in this case to review 
both law and fact and enter the appropriate orders, modifying 
the decree as described above. 
Furthermore, this Court should award the 
Defendant-Respondent a reasonable attorney's fee and costs 
incurred in bringing this appeal. 
Repectfully submitted this 27th day of July, 1990. 
^ 3 ^ ^ 
ellant Pro Se 
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I certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
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Christian, Attorney at Law, New York Building, Third Floor, 
48 Post Office Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this ^ flth 
day of July, 1990. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********************* 
T^HE HOMER, 
-vs-
'EPHEN G. HOMER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
CASE NUMBER CV 87-2098 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having conducted a bench trial in this 
tter will grant the plaintiff a divorce against the defendant 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. The parties have 
ached a stipulation as to a number of the matters in this case, 
d that stipulation is accepted by the Court. The Courtfs 
cision on the other matters at issue between the parties will 
as outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Although the items of personal property have been 
vided as part of the stipulation between the parties, there is 
issue concerning the value of the cars each received, 
fendant claims to be entitled to an offset because his car has 
lower value. The Court finds that the values of the cars are 
ose enough that no offset is required as part of an overall 
uitable property settlement. 
The Court will order the defendant to pay child support 
the amount set forth in the child support schedule. The 
gures in the schedule are to be based on an income of $3627.00 
r the plaintiff and $1673.00 for the defendant. Plaintiff pays 
going child care in the amount of $140.00 per month, 
fendant is presently ordered to pay $200.00 per month child 
At 
support to the children of a previous marriage. Plaintiff is 
awarded $150.00 per month as alimony. 
Plaintiff contends that she should be entitled to a 
judgment for house payments not paid by the defendant after the 
first three months of separation. Plaintiff's claim is based on 
a letter from defendant to plaintiff's counsel. After review of 
the document, the Court finds that it does not create an 
enforceable agreement between the parties. Therefore, plaintiff 
will not be awarded a judgment for back house payments. 
The next issue before the Court is retirement. On the 
subject of retirement, the Court will order that a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order be prepared and submitted to the 
employers of each of the parties. Each of the parties is 
entitled to one half of the retirement programs of the other 
accrued during the course of the marriage. This includes the 
defendant's pension account which he claims is a substitute for 
social security. The Court is not aware of any authority which 
would exempt this type of pension from being divided as a marital 
asset. The only reason social security is not divided is that 
federal law expressly prohibits division. This decision also 
includes division of the retirement account which defendant 
claims belongs to West Jordan City. Each of the parties is 
entitled to one half of the Individual Retirement Account. 
Each side is to bear it's own attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff is awarded costs. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, a qualified domestic 
relations order, and a child support worksheet incorporating the 
terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
i'89 
********************* 
KATHE C. HOMER, 
-vs-
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV87-2098 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having considered defendant's objections to 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce 
submitted by plaintiff, will rule on those objections. The Court 
has also received and reviewed the "Supplemental Findings of 
Fact," prepared by defendant. The Court will not execute those 
proposed findings as they do not accurately reflect the Court's 
ruling in it's memorandum decision, and because much of the 
material contained in the "Supplemental Findings of Fact" is not 
relevant, and appears to be an attempt by defendant to relitigate 
the case. 
Regarding defendant's objections to proposed findings 
of fact, the Court will only address those which appear to have 
merit, or need explanation. The other proposed findings will be 
accepted by the Court without change. 
Defendant's objection to proposed finding #5(m) appears 
to be well taken. Phone calls should only be limited by what is 
reasonable. The Court will therefore amend the finding by 
interlineation. 
Defendant's objection to proposed finding #6 is an 
attempt to relitigate on the issues of the respective values of 
(\A 9RS. 
the cars awarded to the parties. The Court will not change it's 
determination regarding the cars as it is a part of an overall 
equitable property settlement. 
Defendant's objection to proposed finding #11 has 
merit. The proposed order is based on U.C.A. 78-45-7.1 which 
requires that the Court make an order regarding medical and 
dental care. Section 78-45-7.15 (2)(a) U.C.A. requires the 
custodial parent to pay "uninsured routine medical and dental 
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, 
and immunizations." The proposed findings will be changed by 
interlineation to reflect the requirements of this statute. 
Proposed finding #13 will be amended to reflect that 
the minor child is entitled to 33% of the death benefit on 
plaintiff's existing insurance. The finding is to apply only to 
insurance presently in place. 
The Court will not change the proposed order with 
regards to child care expenses, nor will non ordered amounts of 
support paid to other children be considered on the child support 
obligation worksheet. 
Proposed finding #16 regarding alimony accurately 
reflects the Court's intentions. 
Defendant's objection to proposed finding #18 is not 
well taken. Had the defendant wished to limit the plaintiff's 
interest in payments made to retirement programs during the 
pendency of this litigation, he could have moved for a bifurcated 
proceeding, and could likely have ended the marriage shortly 
after the action was filed. Plaintiff is entitled to a 
percentage of whatever retirement benefits were accrued between 
the time of entry into the marriage, and final termination of the 
marriage through this divorce action. 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C. HOMER, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Civil No- 87 2098 
Defendant-
This matter came on before the Honorable Ray M. Harding for 
trial on the 13th day of July, 1989. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The 
Defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Brent D. 
Toung. The Court, after having heard the stipulation of the 
parties as to some of the issues and having heard evidence 
^relating to other issues and having entered its Memorandum 
Decision, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff was an actual and 
toona fide resident of Utah County, State of Utah, for more than 
—hree months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint for 
civorce. 
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2. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant were 
married on August 13, 1980, and since that date have been and now 
are husband and wife. 
3. The Court finds that there has been one child born as 
issue of the marriage, to-wit: Melissa Ann Homer, born July 17, 
1981. 
4. The Court finds that there are irreconcilable 
differences between the parties warranting the entry of a Decree 
of Divorce in this case in favor of the Plaintiff against the 
Defendant which Decree should become final upon entry of the sane 
in the records of the Clerk of the Court. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 
permanent care, custody, and control of the minor child of the 
parties subject to the Defendant's right to visit with the child 
at reasonable times and places. Specifically, the Defendant 
shall be allowed to visit as follows: 
(a) Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday night at 6:00 p.m. with the child to be 
returned one hour prior to church and may pickup the 
child one hour after church is over. 
(b) During the week in which the Defendant does not 
have overnight visitation, he shall be allowed to 
visit with the child on Wednesday evening from 5:00 
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p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(c) The Defendant shall have the right to visit with 
the child on alternate holidays from 10:00 a.m. to 
6:00 p.m. Holidays shall be January 1, President's 
Day, Memorial Day, Easter, July 4, July 24, Labor Day, 
Thanksgiving and Christmas as hereinafter defined. 
(d) The Christmas holiday shall be divided between 
the parties. The Christmas vacation will be the time 
that the child is out of school for Christmas. During 
1989, the Defendant shall have the right to the child 
from the time the children are out of. school through 
December 25 at 2:00 p.m. The Plaintiff shall have the 
right to the child from December 25 at 2:00 p.m. until 
the child goes back to school. The parties shall 
rotate from year to year the part of the Christmas 
vacation that they have with the child. 
(e) The child shall be with the father, the Defendant 
herein, on Father's Day and his birthday from 10:00 
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The child shall be with the mother, 
the Plaintiff herein, on Mother's Day and her 
birthday. Father's Day and Mother's Day as with other 
holidays shall take precedence over normal weekend 
visitation. 
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(f) As it relates to summer visitation, two weeks of 
summer visitation shall be allowed. 
(g) It is ordered that if holidays occur on a Friday 
or a Monday and the Defendant is entitled to the 
weekend visitation either immediately before or after 
the holiday, he shall have the right to have the child 
for weekend visitation and the holiday without the 
need of bringing the child back to the Plaintiff. 
(h) All visitation in this case shall occur at the 
curb side and the Defendant is restrained from coming 
onto the premises of the Plaintiff. Neither party 
shall annoy or harass the other party and neither 
party shall make any disparaging comments to the 
minor child about the other. 
(i) All visitation periods shall be exercised in a 
prompt manner so that both parties can make their 
plans accordingly. The noncustodial parent shall pick 
the child up from the front steps of the custodial 
parent's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior 
and no later than 15 minutes after the visitation 
period commences. Return of the child to the front 
steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also 
be subject to the 15 minute rule. The custodial 
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Kathe Homer vs Stephen Homer 
Civil NO. CV 87 2098 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT # ZJ 
Family "income" (less C/S paid by SGH to WTH) 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Total 
$ 12,163 
$ 33,814 
$ 35,000 
$ 36,335 
$ 31,891 
$ 35,542 
$184,745 
$184,745 x 40% [Kathe1s answer to Interrogatories] = $73,898 expended on Ben and 
Peter during period 1980 through 1985 
Kathe working only September 1985 through December 1985 
1986 and 1987 (to separation of parties in September) not counted as KCH then 
working (1986 only part-time) 
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(m) The noncustodial parent shall, in addition to the 
visitation set forth in this order, have the unlimited 
right to correspond with the minor child of the 
parties and to telephone the minor child during 
reasonable hours without interference or monitoring by 
/c e custodial parent or - anyone^ else in any wayjr"5& '^^ 
(n) Both parties are restrained and enjoined from 
making derogatory and disparaging comments about the 
other party or in any other way diminishing the love, 
respect, and affection that the child has for either 
party. 
(o) Defendant shall give Plaintiff 48 hours advance 
notice if he does not intend to exercise any 
visitation set out herein. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff shall be awarded the 
home and property located at 1015 East 500 North, Orem, Utah, 
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant and the Defendant 
is ordered to quit claim any right, title or interest that he has 
A >2-
in the home and property to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff shall 
be responsible to pay any debts and obligations owing on the 
property and shall hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
7. The Defendant is awarded the fiome and property located 
at 2877 West 9150 South in West Jordan; Salt Lake County, Utah, 
free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff 
is ordered to quit claim any interest -that she has in the home 
and property to the Defendant. The Defendant is required to pay 
all debts and obligations associated with the property and shall 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
8. As it relates to the personal property of the parties, 
each of the parties is awarded the personal property in their 
possession as of the time of the trial in this case free and 
clear of any interest of the other party. To the extent that any 
item of personal property held by a party is titled, the other 
party shall be required to sign any documents effecting the 
division of property. 
9. The Court finds that the partiesk did reserve for trial 
the issue concerning the values of the cars that each received. 
The Defendant claimed to be entitled to an offset because his car 
had a lower value. The Court finds that the values of the cars 
are close enough that no offset is required as part of an overall 
equitable property settlement in this case and confirms the 
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award of the automobiles as they existed at the time of trial. 
10. As it relates to the debts and obligations of the 
narriage, the Court finds that there are no debts and obligations 
Df the marriage with the exception of the obligations each of the 
Darties owe on the real property awarded to them herein. Each of 
the parties is responsible to pay any separately incurred debts 
and obligations since the time of their separation. As it 
relates to any medical expenses that are owed for the minor 
shild, the claims for said sums shall be submitted to the 
respective insurance carriers and each of the parties shall pay 
me-half of any amounts not covered. 
11. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
required to maintain a policy of health and accident insurance 
ipon the minor child of the parties as the same is available to 
:hem through their respective places of employment. Further, 
mrtnfffrf. the parties shall pay one ImisSsmmf -fqf medical, dental, 
/ 
7^i )>rtiiTTrH-f^  np-h-Lds^ r* or related expenses not covered by 
nsurance . AJw nv+i'*£ *ned<'&\l a*<A de\tf&\ &ype<Ase.rs> 43 *->e,U<vs orfkaottvxti'tL 
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12. Each of the parties is restrained from annoying, 
larassing, or otherwise interfering in the lifestyle of the 
ther and further restrained from making any disparaging comments 
o the minor child about each other or otherwise involving the 
inor child in the issues between the parties. 
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THE COURT: If you will come forward please the 
clerk will administer an oath to you. 
(Witness sworn.) 
THE COURT: Be seated here in the witness 
chair. 
LINDA HOMER, 
called as a witness herein, after having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
City. 
Q. Would you tell us your name please? 
A. Linda Homer. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. 3364 West Sunnybrook Drive, West Valley 
Q. How are you related to Steve? 
A. I'm his sister-in-law. 
Q. You married his brother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I direct your attention to August of '74, 
the Brighton family reunion. Do you recall that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to talk with 
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Mrs. Kathy Homer at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she talk about — Well, tell me. Did 
she talk about the separation of the parties, the 
separation of her and her husband or her divorce? 
A. I don't know if she mentioned divorce 
specifically. She told me at that time that she was 
planning on staying with Stephen until Melissa was in 
school. 
MR. YOUNG: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. JOHNSON: We would object and ask it be 
stricken. 
THE COURT: I will permit it to remain. 
Do you have any cross-examination? 
MR. JOHNSON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JOHNSON: 
Q. May I just ask one question? 
Did you ever communicate that to Steve? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. You didn't tell him? 
A. Not that I remember. 
THE COURT: Any objection if she remains? 
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17. The Court finds that the Plaintiff contends that she 
should be entitled to a judgment for house payments not paid by 
the Defendant after the first three months of separation. The 
Plaintiff's claim is based on a letter from Defendant to 
Plaintiff's counsel. After reviewing the document, the Court 
finds that it does not create an enforceable agreement between 
the parties. Therefore, Plaintiff will not be awarded a judgment 
for back house payments. 
18. The Court finds, as it relates to retirement, that the 
Court will order that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order be 
prepared and submitted to the employers of each of the parties. 
Each of the parties is entitled to one-half of the retirement 
programs of the other accrued during the course of the marriage. 
This includes the Defendant's pension account which he claims is 
a substitute for social security. The Court is now aware of any 
authority which exempts this type of pension from being divided 
as a marital asset. The only reason social security is not 
divided is that federal law expressly prohibits division. This 
decision also includes division of the retirement account which 
Defendant claims belongs to West Jordan City. 
19. Each of the parties is entitled to one-half of the 
individual retirement account and that distribution is ordered to 
be effective immediately with both parties being allowed to roll 
10 
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over the retirement account into an account chosen by them. 
20. Each side should bear their own attorney's fees. 
21. Plaintiff is awarded her costs. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
snters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from and 
against the Defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
iifferences which Decree shall become final upon entry of the 
same in the records of the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The parties are entitled to Orders relating to custody, 
visitation, real property, personal property, debts and 
obligations, insurance, Restraining Orders, life insurance, 
ilimony, child support, attorney's fees and retirement as more 
rully set forth in the foregoinq Findings of Fact. egoing 
DATED this £££ day of A«gtisrtr, 
RAY ftTHARDING 
DistrrQt Court Judge 
approved as to form: 
.RENT D. YOUNG 
attorney for Defendant 
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HARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
orney for Plaintiff 
7 South 800 East, Suite 300 
m, Utah 84058 
ephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HE C. HOMER, 
Plaintiff, 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WORKSHEET (SOLE CUSTODY) 
PHEN G. HOMER, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 87-2098 
E AWARD CALCULATION 
Enter the number of children 
of this mother and father 
for whom support is to be 
awarded. 
Enter the father's and 
mother's gross monthly 
income. Refer to 
Instructions for definition 
of income• 
Enter previously ordered 
alimony that is actually 
paid. (Do not enter 
alimony ordered for this 
case) 
Enter previously ordered 
child support. (Do not 
enter payments ordered 
for the child(ren) in 
this case). 
Mother 
///// 
Father Combined 
///// 1 
$1,673 $3,627 /////// 
/////// 
- 200 /////// 
1% IO 
For modification and 
paternity actions only: 
Enter the amount from 
Line 12 of the present 
family worksheet for 
the non-custodial parent. - - /////// 
Subtract lines 2b, 2c, and 
2d from 2a. This is the 
Adjusted Monthly Gross 
for child support purposes. $1,673 $3,427 $5,100 
Take the Combined figure 
in line 3 and the number 
of children in line 1 to the 
Support Table. Find the 
Base Combined Support 
Obligation, Enter it here ////// ////// $ 525 
Divide each parent's 
adjusted monthly gross in 
Line 3 by the Combined 
adjusted monthly gross in 
Line 3. 33% 67% /////// 
Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 
for each parent to obtain 
each parent's share of 
the Base Support Obligation, $173.25 $351,75 /////// 
Enter the child(ren)fs 
portion of monthly medical 
and dental insurance 
premiums paid to insurance 
company. - - /////// 
8. Base Child Support Award 
Subtract Line 7 from Line 6 for the Obligor 
parent. Continue to Page 2 for Extraordinary 
Medical and Child Care Expenses $351.75 
9. Base Amount Per Child 
2 
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Divide Line 8 by Line 1. $351.75 
EXTENDED VISITATION 
The Base Amount Per Child (Line 9) will be reduced by 50% for 
each child for time periods during which specific extended 
visitation of that child with the non-custodial parent is granted 
in the order for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. 
Continuous Extraordinary Expenses/Sold Custody 
Mother Father Combined 
10a. Enter the child(ren)fs 
monthly uninsured continuous 
extraordinary medical 
expenses to be ordered. 
(If none, enter zero in 
Line 11 and go to Line 12a). ////// ////// $ 
10b. Multiply the figure in 
Line 10a by .50 to determine 
each parentfs share of the 
medical expense. $ $ /////// 
11. Amount to be Added to the Base Child Support 
Award for Continuous Extraordinary Medical 
Expenses (Enter Line 10b for the obligor 
parent. Do not include past extraordinary 
medical expenses here. Past expenses should 
be treated as a separate judgment in the order $ 
CHILD CARE EXPENSES 
12. For Work Related Child Care Costs (Adjudicator 
may consider Training Related Child Care). If none 
are claimed, enter zero in #13 and go to #14. 
12a. Enter the full monthly child care payment to be 
paid to the provider. $ 140 
12b. Multiply Line 12a by the number of months the 
child(ren) are in child care during one year. $1,680 
3 
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CHILD CARE TAX CREDIT COMPUTATION 
Multiply the custodial parent's gross monthly 
income from Line 2a on Page 1 by 12 to obtain 
gross annual income. $20,067 
Take Line 12c to Child Care Tax Table in 
Instructions. Find the appropriate percentage 
for the federal tax credit. Enter it here. 24% 
The maximum monthly child care payment allowed 
for the tax credit is $200 for 1 child or $400 
for 2 or more children. Enter the actual 
monthly amount paid, up to the maximum allowed. $ 140 
Multiply Line 12e by the number of months the 
child(ren) are in child care during one year. $1,680 
Multiply Line 12d by Line 12f. This is the 
amount of the Child Care Tax Credit. $ 403.20 
Subtract Line 12g from Line 12b to obtain the 
annual child care amount paid after the child 
care tax credit. $1,276.80 
Divide line 12h by the number of months the 
child(ren) are in care during one year. $ 106.40 
13. Amount to be Added to the Base Child Support 
Award for Child Care. Multiply Line 12i by 
.50. this amount is owed only when child care 
costs are actually incurred. $ 53.20 
14. Total Monthly Child Support Award 
Add Lines 8, 11 and 13. $ 404.95 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C. HOMER, DECREE OF DIVORCE / 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Civil No. 87 2098 
Defendant. 
This matter came on before the Honorable Ray M. Harding for 
trial on the 13th day of July, 1989. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The 
Defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Brent D. 
Young. The Court, after having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from and 
against the Defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences which Decree shall become final upon entry of the 
same in the records of the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody, 
and control of the minor child of the parties subject to the 
tk »»_ 
Defendant's right to visit with the child at reasonable times and 
places. Specifically, the Defendant shall be allowed to visit as 
follows: 
(a) Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday night at 6:00 p.m. with the child to be 
returned one hour prior to church and may pickup the 
child one hour after church is over. 
(b) During the week in which the Defendant does not 
have overnight visitation, he shall be allowed to 
visit with the child on Wednesday evening from 5:00 
p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(c) The Defendant shall have the right to visit with 
the child on alternate holidays from 10:00 a.m. to 
6:00 p.m. Holidays shall be January 1, President's 
Day, Memorial Day, Easter, July 4, July 24, Labor Day, 
Thanksgiving and Christmas as hereinafter defined. 
(d) The Christmas holiday shall be divided between 
the parties. The Christmas vacation will be the time 
that the child is out of school for Christmas. During 
1989, the Defendant shall have the right to the child 
from the time the children are out of school through 
December 25 at 2:00 p.m. The Plaintiff shall have the 
right to the child from December 25 at 2:00 p.m. until 
2 
minor child about the other. 
(i) All visitation periods shall be exercised in a 
prompt manner so that both parties can make their 
plans accordingly. The noncustodial parent shall pick 
the child up from the front steps of the custodial 
parent's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior 
and no later than 15 minutes after the visitation 
period commences. Return of the child to the front 
steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also 
be subject to the 15 minute rule. The custodial 
parent shall have the child fed and ready on time for 
visitation with sufficient clothing packed and ready 
for the visitation period. 
(j) In the event the child is ill and unable to 
visit, a makeup visitation will be allowed to the 
noncustodial parent on the next succeeding weekend. 
However, if the noncustodial parent fails for any 
reason not to exercise his visitation for reasons of 
health or for any other reason, there will be no 
makeup visitation. 
(k) The child will not be permitted to determine 
whether she wishes to visit with the noncustodial 
parent. Personal plans of the custodial parent or 
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the child goes back to school. The parties shall 
rotate from year to year the part of the Christmas 
vacation that they have with the child. 
(e) The child shall be with the father, the Defendant 
herein, on Father's Day and his birthday from 10:00 
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The child shall be with the mother, 
the Plaintiff herein, on Mother's Day and her 
birthday. Father's Day and Mother's Day as with other 
holidays shall take precedence over normal weekend 
visitation. 
(f) As it relates to summer visitation, two weeks of 
summer visitation shall be allowed. 
(g) It is ordered that if holidays occur on a Friday 
or a Monday and the Defendant is entitled to the 
weekend visitation either immediately before or after 
the holiday, he shall have the right to have the child 
for weekend visitation and the holiday without the 
need of bringing the child back to the Plaintiff. 
(h) All visitation in this case shall occur at the 
curb side and the Defendant is restrained from coming 
onto the premises of the Plaintiff. Neither party 
shall annoy or harass the other party and neither 
party shall make any disparaging comments to the 
3 
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ch i ld , school a c t i v i t i e s , church a c t i v i t i e s , or other 
cons iderat ion w i l l not be reasons for fa i l ing t o 
adhere to the v i s i t a t i o n schedule se t forth in the 
order. Only substantial medical reasons wil l be 
considered suf f i c i ent for postponement of v i s i t a t i o n . 
(1) Both part ies wi l l provide addresses and contact 
t e l ephone numbers to the other party and w i l l 
immediately notify the other party of any emergency 
circumstances or substantial changes in the health of 
the ch i ld . 
(m) The noncustodial parent sha l l , in addition to the 
v i s i t a t i o n se t forth in t h i s order, have the unlimited 
r ight to correspond with the minor chi ld of the 
p a r t i e s and to telephone the minor chi ld during 
reasonable hours without interference or monitoring by 
the cus todia l parent or anyone e l s e , in any wayv 
Phom c&f/s (MKOJ oiUr Corrc$f>e>*detA.ce <Xft ktpt u** H*iV Tt^so^xUi^ i 
tfcaiess otherwise agreed to between the p a r t i e s ^ 
telephone cont^reiises between the nonsjjL&tcJHial parent 
and the chi ld shal l be^ir±i^x^B€t^tQrxo more than once 
per week and^&hcfll be, in t o t a l , 15 minutes^&p<L^ss_in 
dy^sTfion. 
(n) Both parties are restrained and enjoined from 
making derogatory and disparaging comments about the 
5 
other party or in any other way diminishing the love, 
respect, and affection that the child has for either 
party. 
(o) Defendant shall give Plaintiff 48 hours advance 
notice if he does not intend to exercise any 
visitation set-out herein, 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the home and property located 
at 1015 East 500 North, Orem, Utah, free and clear of any 
interest of the Defendant and the Defendant is ordered to quit 
claim any right, title or interest that he has in the home and 
property to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff shall be responsible to 
pay any debts and obligations owing on the property and shall 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
4. The Defendant is awarded the home and property located 
at 2877 West 9150 South in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff 
is ordered to quit claim any interest that she has in the home 
and property to the Defendant. The Defendant is required to pay 
all debts and obligations associated with the property and shall 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
5. As it relates to the personal property of the parties, 
each of the parties is awarded the personal property in their 
possession as of the time of the trial in this case free and 
6 
sv _ _ /^V ^«v , 
clear of any interest of the other party. To the extent that any 
item of personal property held by a party is titled, the other 
party shall be required to sign any documents effecting the 
division of property. 
6. No offset is required as part of an overall equitable 
property settlement in this case and the award of the automobiles 
as they existed at the time of trial is confirmed.. 
7. As it relates to the debts and obligations of the 
marriage, there are no debts and obligations of the marriage 
with the exception of the obligations each of the parties owe on 
the real property awarded to them herein. Each of the parties is 
responsible to pay any separately incurred debts and obligations 
since the time of their separation. As it relates to any medical 
expenses that are owed for the minor child, the claims for said 
sums shall be submitted to the respective insurance carriers and 
each of the parties shall pay one-half of any amounts not 
covered. 
8. Each of the parties should be required to maintain a 
policy of health and accident insurance upon the minor child of 
the parties as the same is available to them through their 
Pfotxtifc* 
respective places of employment. Further, oae-h -ec& the parties 
shall pay wiihi iiul C of any medical, dental, orthoeLofttic,—optico-i 
ox related expenses not covered by insurance, /l/an f^oii^c wed\tiy.[ 
aM denial x^peiAStfs as t^ell &s orttWonf/t avval apfj&jj expeiAces Arc 
id be £ ) W by H\^ p<xrt\x€<z> <rnt * kal/•*<?<* ^ . 
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9. Each of the parties is restrained from annoying, 
arassing, or otherwise interfering in the lifestyle of the 
ther and further restrained from making any disparaging comments 
o the minor child about each other or otherwise involving the 
inor child in the issues between the parties. 
10. The Defendant shall be required to name the minor child 
PmbeAflhlu held 
f this marriage as beneficiary of any life insurance pnrrhn^ r.d 
/ him or ma4e—available—bo—him—Lluuugh hio omploymgujg^o the 
33>% 
stent of J|&% of the value or death benefit thereof. 
11. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
104.95 as child support payable in two equal monthly payments on 
le 5th and 20th of each month commencing with July, 1989. 
12. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
L50.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly 
lyments on the 5th and 20th of each month commencing July, 1989. 
13. Plaintiff is not awarded judgment for back due house 
tyments against the Defendant. 
14. The Court authorizes the entry of a Qualified Domestic 
Nations Order in this case to be submitted to the employers of 
tch of the parties awarding each of them one-half of the 
tirement programs of the other accrued during the course of the 
rriage including the Defendants pension plan,'claimed to be a 
bstitute for social security, and the retirement account which 
8 
4t 
idant claims belongs to West Jordan City among the others 
Lfied to at trial. 
15. Each of the parties is entitled to one-half of the 
/idual retirement account with accrued interest and the 
Les are ordered forthwith to distribute that amount so that 
of the parties can - choose their own retirement program. 
16. Each side should bear their own attorney's fees. 
17. Plaintiff is awarded her costs. 
DATED this cCV day of Aug**©* 
RAY V£ HARDING 
District Court Judge 
ved as to form: 
D. YOUNG 
ney for Defendant 
A*?M 
ADDENDA 
#5 Trial Court's "Memorandum Decision" 
(2 January 1990) 
RECORD p. 3 55 A31 
«TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE 0? 'ITJIL' 
UTi:- ? V 7 T 7 
to 4 2,37 fi-i '90 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
THE HOMER, 
Plaintiffs, Case Number CV87-2098 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
2PHEN HOMER, 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court, having considered plaintiff's motion to 
and the findings, will deny that motion, noting that the 
idings previously executed adequately express the opinion of 
2 Court. 
Dated this 2nd day of January, 
[. HARDING, JUDtefi" 
Richard B. Johnson, Esq. 
Stephen B. Homer, Esq. 
ADDENDA 
#6 Defendant's Proposed "Supplemental Findings of 
Fact" (unsigned) 
RECORD pp. 381-396 A32-A47 
./ * " * 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
P 0 Box 493 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone 561-1463 
Defendant Pro Se 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State ol Utah 
rrtRMABLSMITH, Clerk 
Of .__. Deputy 
4TH 01 
STAT 
UTAH 
OCT i ) a '89 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE HOMER, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
STEPHEN HOMER, 
Defendant 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
*}pa? <zY ^J 
Civi l Nc. P ' 87 2098 
[Judge Ray Harding] 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d a c t i o n having been t r i e d be fo re the Cour t , s i t t i n g 
without a ju ry , on July 13 , 1989, and 
The Defendant having moved the Court therefor , and 
I t appear ing t o t h e Court t h a t t h e r e i s subs tan t i a l evidence supporting 
such f indings , and 
There appear ing good cause t h e r e f o r , the Court e n t e r s the fo l lowing 
Supplemental Findings of Fact : 
1. The P l a i n t i f f i s 45 years o ld . 
2. The Defendant i s 41 years o ld . 
3 . The P l a i n t i f f ' s evidence as to the " i r reconc i lab le differences" between the 
P l a in t i f f and the Defendant, was (1) tha t in September 1980 the P l a i n t i f f was 
unhappy wi th t h e Defendan t ' s response when her "seal ing" to her f i r s t husband 
was c a n c e l l e d and (2) t h a t in March 1981 the Defendant claimed t o have 
f o r g o t t e n t o c a r r y through with t h a t week 's "ass ignment" from a mar r i age 
counselor . The Defendant does not want to terminate the marriage. 
4. The Plaintiff is a college graduate, possesses a baccalaureate degree in 
education from Brigham Young University, has a "teaching certificate" and has 
taken post-graduate courses. The Plaintiff appears to be in good health, has 
claimed no unusual health or medical problems which would prevent her from 
supporting herself, and has since the separation of the parties in September 
1987 supported herself without incurring any significant indebtedness. 
5. For eight years prior to the instant marriage, the Plaintiff supported 
herself and her two adolescent boys on her own earnings and $230 per month 
(total) child support. 
6. The Plaintiff presently is employed full-time in the Orem Public Library 
and receives a salary of over $20,000.00 per year. 
7. The Plaintiff, as benefits of her employment, is entitled to medical and 
health insurance coverage and participates in the Utah State Retirement System 
as well as other retirement programs sponsored by her employer. 
8. The Plaintiff owns a parcel of real estate in Box Elder County. 
9. The Plaintiff in 1979 purchased her home in Orem, Utah County. 
10. The male children of the plaintiff from a previous marriage have reached 
the age of majority and are no longer dependent upon her for care or support. 
11. The Defendant acquired his undergraduate and professional education and had 
obtained the employment he continued to have throughout the marriage before the 
marriage to the Plaintiff. 
12. The Plaintiff made no investment or personal sacrifice in the furtherance 
of the Defendant's education, as the instant marriage occurred after that 
education was completed. 
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13. The P l a i n t i f f suffered no economic deprivations following the marriage, 
said deprivations resulting from paying back student loans for the Defendant's 
schooling, as those student loans were paid back before the instant marriage. 
14. The instant marriage did not terminate any alimony to the Plaint iff as she 
had no alimony from her previous marriage. 
15. For seven years the Plaintiff, together with her then-teenage ch i ld ren , 
were reap the benef i t of the economic investment the Defendant had made in 
himself prior to the marriage. 
16. Prior to the marriage, the Plaintiff gave notice to her employer that she 
was going to quit her job, which paid her less than $600 per month "takehome". 
She effected that termination of employment in mid-September 1980. This allowed 
her to s tay home and take care of her then-teenage sons from a previous 
marriage. As the P l a i n t i f f was in an under-employed working si tuation, that 
voluntary termination of employment was not claimed to have any adverse effect 
upon her professional career advancement opportunities. 
17. The Defendant contributed more than $72,000 between the years 1980 through 
1985 for the d i r e c t support of the two sons of the Plaintiff . This does not 
include expenses for the minor chi ld of the p a r t i e s (Melissa) nor does i t 
include tha t share of the household expenses for the parties themselves. The 
Defendant contributed additional amounts for the direct support of the two sons 
of the P l a i n t i f f in the years 1986 and 1987, pr ior to the separation of the 
part ies on September 15, 1987. 
18. Other than "ret irement" programs which consist of pre-tax contributions 
made by the Defendant as described below, the p a r t i e s only s ign i f i can t asse t 
acquired during the ins tan t marriage was the West Jordan house and two motor 
vehicles. 
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19. The parties stipulated in open court that the value of the Orem house and 
the value of the Vfest Jordan house were essentially equal and that the claims of 
the parties to such real estate and the improvements thereon would not be 
litigated and that the Court could award possession and title of the Orem real 
estate to the Plaintiff and of the West Jordan real estate to the Defendant, 
20. Other than the "retirement" programs, the parties did not accumulate 
significant other assets (such as stocks, bonds, precious metals) subject to 
division. Except for the motor vehicles, the parties have privately divided 
their assets of personal property and have not sought the Court's intervention 
in that regard. 
21. On September 15, 1987, the Defendant faced with the threat of a court 
order enjoining his living in the marital residence left the marital 
residence. 
22. Since September 15, 1987, the plaintiff has done nothing in the reasonable 
furtherance of the marriage "partnership" and has, since September 9, 1987/ 
actually filed this litigation to have the marriage terminated. 
23. If the divorce had been granted immediately upon filing and an equitable 
property settlement effected at that time, the plaintiff would not have been 
entitled to share in the assets acquired thereafter, as she had voluntarily and 
unilaterally terminated the marital "partnership". 
24. The fact that the law requires a formal, judicial proceeding to terminate 
the marriage should not obscure the fact that subsequent to the filing of this 
action, the Plaintiff did nothing, except attempt to frustrate and negate the 
legitimate expectations of the marital "partnership" and should not be heard to 
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claim a por t ion of the earnings of the Defendantf as though she had been the 
supportive, loving, sharing "partner" as was originally intended at the time the 
marriage was undertaken. 
25. The ground for divorce of "irreconcilable differences" was not a part of 
Utah law at the time the marital contract was joint ly entered into. 
26. The Court f inds tha t a divorce action, particularly when coupled with an 
involuntary separat ion from one fs c h i l d r e n , i s one of the most emotionally 
traumatic si tuations which can be inflicted upon someone. 
27. The P l a i n t i f f ' s f i l i ng of the i n s t an t act ion and her pursuing the 
threatened cour t order to involuntarily remove the Defendant from the marital 
residence significantly affected many of his social and religious friendships. 
28. During the course of the seven-year marriage, the Plaintiff consistently 
refused to relocate from the Orem hone, even though such would have been more 
convenient to her husband's work and professional advancement in West Jordan, 
thir ty miles away. 
29. During the course of the seven-year marriage, the Plaintiff failed to place 
her husband's name on t i t l e to her hone, even though she expected him to make 
the mortgage payments therefor. 
30. The P l a i n t i f f presented no evidence concerning the expenses specifically 
necessary to raise Melissa. Melissa has no presen t ly diagnosed extraordinary 
medical conditions or handicaps requiring unusual financial expenses. 
31. Melissa is presently 8 years old. When she reaches the age of 9 yea r s , she 
wi l l no longer need child care. The portion of the "child support" award should 
terminate on Melissa's 9th birthday and the Decree of Divorce should ident i fy 
this separate component and provide for i t s termination upon her 9th birthday. 
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32. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d tha t she must work two Saturdays per month. If the 
v is i t ia t ion schedule is approved, and Defendant has vis i ta t ion pr iv i leges , then 
the P l a i n t i f f would incur no child care expenses for those two Saturdays, for 
which she tes t i f ied concerning her expected, but unsubstant ia ted , chi ld care 
expenses. Similarly, if the Defendant exercises his "summer11 visi tat ion when she 
is "off-track11 during the month of July 1990, the expected ch i ld -care expenses 
will be significantly reduced. 
33. Under federal and s tate s ta tute , the custodial parent is entitled to claim 
the "personal exemption" for the dependent minor c h i l d , Melissa, against the 
income taxes which must be f i l e d . Under the federal law, the value of this 
"exemption" is $1970; under state law, the value of the exemption is $1435. 
34. The Defendant's marginal tax bracket i s 28% for federal and 7.35% for 
s t a te . Because he is not allowed to claim the "exemption", his federal taxes are 
increased by $551.60 over what he would have to pay in taxes if he were to have 
custody of the dependent minor. The Defendant's s tate income taxes are increased 
by $105.47. These two to ta l to $657.07. 
35. Because the P l a i n t i f f has custody of the dependent minor child, she is 
e l i g i b l e to claim the child as a "personal exemption". The value of the 
exemption i s the same $657.07 as noted above, additionally, the Plaintiff i s , 
because the dependent minor res ides with her , e n t i t l e d to claim "head of 
household s ta tus" , thus ent i t l ing her to a lower income tax rate for the federal 
income taxes. 
36. The chi ld support guidel ines do not take the issue of the income tax 
exemption into account, as the guidelines are "custody-neutral". Nevertheless , 
the award of custody does have that effect. 
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37* I t i s equi tab le to adjust the chi ld support guidel ines by the monthly 
equiavalent of those amounts (approximately $55.00 per month) to take in to 
account the disparate income tax consequences. 
38. The Defendant is the father of two minor-age sons and is obligated to pay, 
pursuant to court order entered in 1977, the sum of $100*00 per month per child 
for their support. Those children reside with the i r na tu ra l mother in another 
s t a t e . In June 1987 the Defendant agreed with the i r mother tha t the child 
support payments would be increased to $150.00 per chi ld per month. Although 
this change was not formalized by an amendment to the formal divorce decree, the 
Defendant has consistently and regularly paid at least the $150.00 per month per 
chi ld amount as was agreed by him. There is no indication to the Court that the 
Defendant would not continue to honor the oral promise to the custodial parent. 
39. During the course of the marriage the part ies acquired two motor vehicles. 
Subsequent to the separation of the part ies in September 1987 the p l a in t i f f has 
had the sole use and possession of the 1983 Honda vehicle. In June 1988 the 
Plaintiff , in her "financial declaration", claimed that the value of the Honda 
vehicle was $6,000 and that the value of the 1981 Datsun vehicle was $1,000. In 
documents furnished the Court a t t r i a l , the P l a i n t i f f claimed tha t the 1983 
Honda vehicle was $4,000 and the 1981 Datsun vehicle was worth $1,000. 
40. The diminution of value, if any, in the 1983 Honda vehicle has occured 
during P l a i n t i f f ' s use of the vehicle, which has been in her sole custody and 
possession since the separation of the par t ies . 
41. The d i s p a r i t y in value of the two motor vehicles was expressly reserved 
pursuant to the " p r e - t r i a l " order , the wording of which was drafted by the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel . Except for the "retirement accounts" of the par t i es , the 
division of personal properties of the part ies was not to be- l i t igated. 
42. The Defendant contributed over $6,000 in cash fron earnings prior to the 
instant marriage for family expenses of the instant marriage. 
43. The Plaintiff's oldest son (Ben) lived with the Plaintifffs sister from 
September 1983 through August 1984; he lived in own apartment between November 
1986 to February 1987 and was on active duty with the United States Army Reserve 
in May and June 1987. The Plaintiff's youngest son (Peter) lived at home with 
the parties at all times since the instant marriage and prior to the separation 
of the parties. For the years indicated, the "family income" available to the 
household by reason of the earnings of the Defendant (less child support he paid 
to his former spouse), was: 
1980 $ 12,163 
1981 $ 33,814 
1982 $ 35,000 
1983 $ 36,335 
1984 $ 31,891 
1985 $ 35,542 
Total $184,745 
Approximately $1600 of that amount was fron the earnings of the Plaintiff . The 
Plaintiff answers to interrogatories and her o ra l testimony before the court 
indicated tha t a fa i r method of allocating the household expenses was upon the 
proportionate share the family members living in the hone. Using that method of 
ca l cu l a t i on , $73,898 expended on Ben and Peter during period 1980 through 1985. 
Almost the entirety of that amount came fron the earnings of the Defendant. The 
Defendant a l so contr ibuted s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the household expenses of the 
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f ami ly , i n c l u d i n g the then-minor c h i l d r e n of the p l a i n t i f f , during the years 
1986 and 1987, including the payment of the Orem house mortgage payment through 
November 1987, when both chi ldren then adu l t s—were s t i l l l iv ing a t home. 
44. In 1982 the Defendant and h i s employer began contr ibut ing to the s o - c a l l e d 
"Pension" a c c o u n t , a t a x - d e f e r r e d r e t i r e m e n t program authorized pursuant to 
Section 401(a) of the In terna l Revenue Code. The contr ibut ions to t h i s a ccoun t , 
i n t o which t h e Defendant has c o n t r i b u t e d 6.65% of h i s wages, cor respond 
general ly to s i m i l a r amounts which would have been deducted from h i s wages 
and/or c o n t r i b u t e d t o the federal soc i a l secur i ty program. In January 1982 the 
Defendant's employer (West Jordan Ci ty) "withdrew" from the f e d e r a l s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y sys t em. Since January 1982 no c o n t r i b u t i o n s have been made to the 
f ede ra l s o c i a l s e c u r i t y system by t h e Defendant or by h i s employer in h i s 
beha l f . S ince Janua ry 1982 the Defendant has not a cc rued , by reason of h i s 
ful l - t ime employment with West Jordan Ci ty , any service c r e d i t s , upon which h i s 
future soc ia l secur i ty benefi t would be based. 
45. In 1982 the Defendant and h i s employer began contr ibut ing to the s o - c a l l e d 
"Ret i rement" a c c o u n t , a tax-deferred ret i rement program authorized pursuant to 
Section 401(a) of the In terna l Revenue Code. The contr ibut ions to t h i s a c c o u n t , 
i n t o which t h e Defendant has c o n t r i b u t e d 12.90% of h i s wages, cor respond 
general ly to s i m i l a r amounts which would have been deducted from h i s wages 
and/or contr ibuted to the Utah State Retirement System. 
46. Since 1983 the Defendant has p a r t i c i p a t e d in a "de fe r red compensat ion" 
program wi th h i s employer. Under the terms of that program and pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 457 of the I n t e r n a l Revenue Code, the compensation so 
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"deferred" remains the property of West Jordan City (his employer) , subject or 
to the claims of the general creditors of the City and is subject 
"substantial risk of forfeiture," per federal statute. 
47. The value of the Defendant's "retirement" accounts on the date of t 
separation of the parties (15 Sep 87) was: 
"Pension" (replaces social security): $34,541.37 
"Retirement" (replaces Utah State Ret. Syst.): $39,572.43 
Deferred compensation: $26,633.19 
Individual retirement account (Draper Bank): $ 8,975.27 
The value of the Plaintiff's "retirement" accounts on the date of the separati 
of the parties (15 Sep 87) was: 
Utah State Retirement System : $ 
Orem City Employees 401 Plan $ 
Orem City Employees Deferred compensation (ICMA) $ 
48. The value of the Defendant's "retirement" accounts on the date of the tri 
(13 July 1989) was: 
"Pension" (replaces social security): $47,064.25 
"Retirement" (replaces Utah State Ret. Syst.): $53,875.34 
Deferred compensation: $30,001.71 
Individual retirement account (Draper Bank): $ 9,550.00 (approx.) 
The foregoing values include the value of the accounts at the time of separati 
(15 Sep 87), plus interest accruing thereto, and, in the case of all accour 
except the "individual retirement account", additional contributions mc 
thereto (and interest accrued thereto) by the Defendant and/or his employer 
his behalf subsequent to the separation of the parties. 
The va lue of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s " r e t i r e m e n t " accounts on the date of the t r i a 
(July 13, 1989) was: 
Utah Sta te Retirement System $ 
Orem City Deferred Compensation (ICMA) $ 
Orem City 401 plan (Mutual of New York) $ 
No ev idence was p r e s e n t e d as t o the p r e s e n t v a l u e , e i t h e r on the d a t e o 
s e p a r a t i o n of t he p a r t i e s (15 Sep 87) or on the date of t r i a l (13 Ju l 89) , o 
the P l a i n t i f f ' s i n t e r e s t in the ret i rement program sponsored by the Utah S t a b 
Ret i rement System* Under the p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 49 of the Utah Code, th< 
r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s due the P l a i n t i f f a r e determined based upon her f i na 
average s a l a r y , t he number of years she worked under tha t program, the age a 
which she e l e c t s t o begin r e c e i v i n g r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s , and the s t a tu to ry 
scheme then in ef fec t when she makes appl ica t ion to receive retirement benef i t s 
49. Subsequent t o the s e p a r a t i o n of the p a r t i e s (September 15 , 1987) th< 
Defendant (and /or h i s employer in h i s behalf) has made, t o the date of t r i a l 
the following cont r ibut ions to the "ret irement" accounts in h i s name: 
"Pension" $8,951.39 
"Retirement" $9,954.79 
"Deferred compensation" $3,858.55 
50. Subsequent to the separation of the p a r t i e s (15 Sep 87) the " r e t i r e m e n t ' 
accounts of the Defendant have accrued i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t the then-accruec 
balances in the following amounts: 
"Pens ion" " Re t irement" 
"Base value" (15 Sep 87) $34,541.37 $39,572.43 
4th Quarter 1987 (Oct thru Dec) 
1st Quarter 1988 (Jan thru Mar) 
2nd Quarter 1988 (Apr thru Jun) 
3rd Quarter 1988 (Jul thru Sep) 
4th Quarter 1989 (Oct thru Dec) 
8.56% 
8.32% 
8.07% 
7.90% 
8.12% 
9.00% 
8.76% 
8.54% 
8.42% 
8.15% 
Based upon the foregoing interest rates accruing to the retirement accounts, the 
calculated value of the accounts, as of 1 March 89 was: 
$38,601.31 $44,420.16 
51. From 1982 (the establishment of the accounts) through 30 September 1987, 
the following amounts were contributed by the Defendant or his employer in his 
behalf, to the Vfest Jordan employees retirement programs: 
"pension" "Retirement" 
SS repl. USRS repl. 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 (thru Sep 87) 
TOTALS 
$ 4121.01 
$ 4560.07 
$ 4346.13 
$ 4817.30 
$ 5003.89 
$ 3786.39 
$26,634.79 
$ 3416.94 
$ 6897.99 
$ 4941.58 
$ 5357.21 
$ 5564.72 
$ 4210.83 
$30,389.2' 
52. The values of the Defendant's retirement accounts and the interest amounts 
accrued thereto, on the dates indicated, were: 
"Pension" (to replace Social Security coverage) 
Actual contributions made prior to 15 Sep 87 (separation) $26,634.79 
Accrued interest to 15 Sep 87 
Value as of 15 September 1987 $34,541.37 
Contributions made since 15 Sep 87 $ 8,951.39 
Interest earned since 15 Sep 87 (entire account) 
Interest earned on portion of account at time of separation 
Present value of that portion of account 
Value at time of trial (13 Jul 89) $47,064.25 
"Retirement" account (to replace Utah State Retirement System) 
Actual contributions made prior to 15 Sep 87 (separation) $30,389.27 
Accrued interest to 15 Sep 87 
Value as of 15 September 1987 $39,572.43 
Contributions made since 15 Sep 87 $ 9,954.79 
Interest earned since 15 Sep 87 (entire account) 
In t e r e s t earned on port ion of account a t time of separat ion 
Present value of t ha t portion of account 
Value a t time of t r i a l (13 Ju l 89) $53,875.34 
SGH Individual Retirement Account [I.R.A.] (Draper Bank) 
Actual cont r ibut ions made pr ior to 15 Sep 87 (separation) $ 6,390.00 
Contributions made since 15 Sep 87 0.00 
Value a t time of t r i a l (13 Ju l 89) approximately $ 9,550.00 
West Jordan City "deferred compensation" (IRC Sec 457) 
Actual cont r ibut ions made pr ior to 15 Sep 87 (separation) $17,956.33 
Accrued i n t e r e s t to 15 Sep 87 8,676.86 
Value as of 15 September 1987 $26,633.19 
Contributions made since 15 Sep 87 $ 3,858.55 
In t e r e s t earned since 15 Sep 87 (en t i re account) 
In t e r e s t earned on port ion of account a t time of separat ion 
Present value of tha t port ion of account 
Valuation a t time of t r i a l (13 J u l 89) $30,001.00 
53. The Defendant has knowingly and vo lun ta r i ly waived any claim he has in the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s "ret irement" accounts for contr ibut ions made t h e r e t o subsequent tc 
t he s e p a r a t i o n of the p a r t i e s (September 1 5 , 1987) . As the va lue of the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s re t i rement accounts based on her earnings previous to the separat ior 
of the p a r t i e s (September 15, 1987) was r e l a t i v e l y (when compared to the value 
of h i s r e t i r e m e n t accounts ) i n s i g n i f i c a n t and c o n s i d e r i n g the f a c t t h a t 
a d d i t i o n a l cos t s of l i t i g a t i o n to verify such amount would be unproductive, the 
Defendant has vo lun ta r i ly and knowingly waived any c l a im he might have for ar 
i n t e r e s t in such r e t i r e m e n t accounts of the p l a i n t i f f . This waiver i s for the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s "ret i rement" programs admin i s t e r ed by the Utah S t a t e Retirement 
System, t he Orem Ci ty a l t e r n a t i v e " r e t i r e m e n t " account and the defe r red 
compensation account (ICMA) . 
54. Under the provisions of Section 416(d) of Title 42 United States Gode (the 
Social Security Act), the Plaintiff, as a surviving divorced spouse, would not 
be entitled to social security benefits based upon the earnings of the 
Defendant, because the parties were not married the required ten years. 
Similarly, the Defendant would not be entitled to receive social security 
benefits based upon the earnings of the Plaintiff. 
55. Because the Plaintiff has chosen to terminate the instant marriage, she is 
entitled to no benefits under the federal social security program as the parties 
have not been married the requisite ten years. 42 United States Gode, Sectior 
416(d). 
56. Since 1982 the Defendant has, through his employment with West Jordan City, 
not participated in the federal social security program. Consequently, not onlj 
has he not contributed any monies to the federal social security system since 
1982, but he has not accrued any "service credit years" upon which his ultimate 
social security benefit will be calculated. 
57. Pursuant to the Windfall Elimination Program of the federal social security 
program, the Defendant will be subjected to a substantial reduction in his basic 
social security benefit by reason of his having the aforementioned "retirement1 
programs based upon earnings which were not "covered" under the federal socia* 
security system. 
58. The monies contributed and/or accrued to the foregoing "retirement' 
accounts have been tax-deferred. It is reasonable to require the Plaintiff, i 
she chooses to liquidate the foregoing foregoing accounts to pay the incom< 
taxes, early withdrawal penalties (if any) , surrender penalties (if any) an< 
similar charges accrued by reason of the liquidation of such accounts and t< 
hold the Defendant harmless from such taxes, penalties and/or charges. 
59. If the Court were to equally divide the "retirement" account asse t s of the 
p a r t i e s , valued a t the time of the d ivorce , such would e n t i t l e the P l a i n t i f f t o 
an p r e - t a x amount in excess of $70/000/ which would e s s e n t i a l l y be immediately 
avai lable to her for investment or l iv ing expenses. The i n t e r e s t which could be 
earned from the inves tment of tha t $70/000 a t 8% would be in excess of $5/000 
per year . Such would not require the invasion of the p r i n c i p a l . 
60. The P l a i n t i f f acqu i red the "Orem house" l e s s than one year pr ior to the 
marriage to the Defendant. The p a r t i e s l ived in the house during the seven-year 
marriage. During the seven-year marriage the Defendant paid the mortgage payment 
on the house from his earnings . The P l a i n t i f f did not put the house mortgage nor 
t h e r e a l e s t a t e t i t l e in the name of the Defendant or in thei r j o in t names a t 
any time during the marriage. At the time of the s e p a r a t i o n the o b l i g a t i o n t o 
pay the Orem house mortgage payment was so le ly in the P l a i n t i f f ' s name. 
61 . In h i s September 15/ 1987 l e t t e r t o P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l , t he Defendant 
agreed t o make the Orem house payment of the P l a i n t i f f for the months of 
September, October and November 1987. The Defendant made those house payments. 
62. At t h a t t ime , the P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel had no object ions to the Defendant's 
s ta ted l imi ta t ion on the months in which he would make the house payment. 
63. On December 1 1 / 1987/ the Defendant te lephonical ly informed the P l a in t i f f 
t ha t he had agreed to make the Orem house payment only through November 1987. 
64. The P l a i n t i f f made the December 1987 house payment for the Orem house and 
has paid a l l mortgage payments subsequent t he r e to . 
65. Even though there were ongoing contacts between the P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel and 
the Defendant (such as the f i l ing of a formal Answer, d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t s and 
r e s p o n s e s , o b j e c t i o n s t o c e r t i f i c a t i o n of r e a d i n e s s for t r i a l , and the 
Defendant's motion to compel discovery) subsequent t o the September 15/ 1987 
l e t t e r , t h e r e was no indicat ion from P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel to the Defendant that 
there was a second in t e rp re t a t ion to the l e t t e r u n t i l the Defendant was served 
with an "order to show cause" on March 29, 1988. 
66. There was no meeting of the minds between the Defendant and the P l a i n t i f f ' s 
counse l concern ing the Defendan t ' s a l l e g e d obl igat ion to make the Orem house 
payment for months af ter November 1987. 
67. Beginning in September 1983 and a t a l l times continuously the rea f t e r , the 
P l a i n t i f f , i n t e n t i o n a l l y and knowingly, has t r e a t e d the 
Defendan t -counte rc la imant in a cruel manner, including but not l imited to the 
wi thhold ing of p h y s i c a l and v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n s of a f f e c t i o n , emot iona l , 
s p i r i t u a l and f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t , c aus ing g r e a t menta l d i s t r e s s t o the the 
Defendant-counterclaimant, such tha t the leg i t imate expectat ions of the mar i t a l 
r e l a t ionsh ip were and are rendered impossible. 
68. Beginning in September 1983 and a t a l l t imes t h e r e a f t e r , the P l a i n t i f f 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y and knowingly, has , except in a se l f -benef i t t ing economic sense 
denied and/or acted contrary to the leg i t imate expectat ions wi th in t he mar i t a ! 
r e l a t i o n s h i p and has used the s a id m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p for her own unjus 
economic enrichment. 
Entered t h i s day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
judge of the D i s t r i c t Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
l\ Af\ 
ADDENDA 
#7 Photocopy of Plaintiff's personal resume1 
EXHIBIT #25 A48-A49 
Kathe Homer vs Stephen Homer 
Civil No. CV 87 2098 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT # 
Photocopy of resume of Kathe C Drinkwater (Homer) , prepared by her, showinc 
employment skills, education, etc. 
nvtf 
Ktount 
KATHE C. DRINKWATER 
12324 S.E. 198th St. 
Renton, Washington 98055 
(206) 854-5749 
OBJECTIVE 
Customer Services Representative Position utilizing organizational, 
communication and human relations skills developed in previous 
exper ience. 
EDUCATION 
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 1973-1976 - Graduate work 
and research in expository writing, world crises and psychology. 
Green River Community College, Auburn, Washington, 1972-1973 - Preschool 
and family living courses. 
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 1964-1967, B. A. Degree and 
Teaching Certificate - Majors, Political Science and International 
Relations with minor in French. 
University of California, Berkeley, California, 1962-1964. 
Coronado High School, Coronado, California, graduated I962. 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
Instructor, Kent School District, Kent, Washington, 1974-1976 
Ass't. Librarian, Kent School District, Kent, Washington, 1973-1974 
Coordinator, Benson Hill Preschool, Renton, Washington, 1973 
Recreation Co-ordinator, South King County YMCA, Kent, Wash., ]972 
Teacher, LDS Preschool, Renton, Washington, 1972 
Banquet and Convention Mgr., Royal Inn Restaurant, Provo, Utah, 1966 
QUALIFICATIONS 
Management: 
Developing and organizing units of work 
Analyzing problems and producing solutions 
Co-ordinating activities of subordinates 
Supervising materials circulation 
Communication: 
Orally presenting information to large and small groups 
Leading group discussions 
Writing reports 
Doing evaluations 
Human Relations: 
Working'with colleagues of widely differing philosophies to 
develop mutually acceptable programs 
Encouraging learning and co-operation from individuals of 
varied backgrounds 
Research: 
Locating informat ion in l i b r a r i e s , pub l ica t ions , p r i va te agencies, 
bibleographic l i s t s , e t c . 
Co l lec t ing and organizing informat ion fo r easy access 
ADDENDA 
#8 West Jordan City Council Resolution No. 81-200 
EXHIBIT #19 A50-A52 
Kathe Homer vs Stephen Homer 
Civi l No. CV 87 2098 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT # 
Photocopy of West Jordan Ci ty Council Reso lu t ion #81-200, es tab l i sh ing th 
"Pension" r e t i r e m e n t program for c i t y employees t o r e p l a c e s o c i a l s e c u r i t 
coverage which would be l o s t 1 Jan 1982. 
A5o 
WEST JORDA: 
A J .unic ipcl Cor pore-tion 
RESOLUTION KO. 81-200 
A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE 
LXECUTICH Aff: PAJ;TIC1PATI0>: 
IK A CCKTRACT UITK BENEFICIAL 
LIFE IKSUitAiVCE CCKPAKY ML 
STANDARD IKSUEAI-CE COtlPAHY PEK-
TAINIIJG TO THE COVERAGE CF CITY 
EMPLOYEES FOR GROUF TEST: LIFE 
JNSURAhCE, DISABILITY LIFE IN-
SURANCE, A:JD A RETIRESEKT PACKAGE.. 
Uhnrcas , t he Ci ty Council has withdr.--v.7i c i t y criplcye-s frc:i p r o t e c t i o n 
under the? Soc ia l .Security Act e f f e c t i v e Jnnurry 1, 1?£2; and 
L h e r e a s , t he Ci ty Council desires to provide* ; b e n e f i t s p sc l^ se to V.i* 
cnp loyees in l i e u of such c c v e r r j e under the Socicl Secur i ty Act; and 
L'hereas , the Ci ty V:\ncgtr h?s ir.vc-stijjr.ted a nusber of p lans to provide sue 
coverage and has reccn;aended the p l a n s presented by the Benef i c i a l Life 
Insura-nco Company and the Standard Insurance Gonpany; and 
Whereas, t h e City Council f i nds t h a t t h e sa id p i rns w i l l adequate ly end 
f a i r l y and :ccn]j:lfctcl_y p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the City dncl i t s 
employees , 
WW, THEREFORE, bE IT HE3CLVED bY THE CITY COUNCIL OF WEST JOEDAh, UTAh: 
Sec t ion 1. That the a t t ached agreements between the City and 
B e n e f i c i a l Life In su rance Company r.nd bet.i.een the City y.r.4 the Strndn-c 
lnsurc-r.ee Company are hereby adopted a s though s e t f o r th in i t s e n t i r t t 
S e c t i o n 2 . The layor end City Recorder arc authori i r -d 5r.1I d i r e c t e d 
to s ign such agreement for end in b e h a l f of the C i t y . 
S e c t i o n j . T'iC Ci ty h; :n; jcr and olh.er a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c i a l s :•;re-
d i r e c t e d t o c o o p e r a t e with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the insurr-ncf companies 
in iMplr - ien t ing t h i s pl i r . to i n c l u d e the enrol lment of the c i t y snploy 
under t h e plan and to s a t i s f a c t o r i l y expla in the plan to t h e c i t y 
employees . 
AS I 
c a t i o n «. Payaents and covcraEc under the rl*n s*«*ll not bc3In unt i l 
Janunry 1. 1SG2. 
Section 5 . T..is reso lu t ion shal l become eff te t iv* inu.crfi.tcly. 
Woctcd by the City Council of U s t Jordan th i s 1st day of Deceaber. 1VE1. 
Junius h. fur ton, *ayor 
ATTEi1: 
*A 
\xxirl L. Andersen, City hecorder 
A 5 ^ 
ADDENDA 
#9 West Jordan City Council Resolution No. 81-199 
EXHIBIT #20 A53-A54 
Kathe Homer vs Stephen Homer 
Civi l No. CV 87 2098 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT # 
Photocopy of West Jordan Ci ty Counci l Reso lu t ion #81-199, i n d i c a t i n g C 
Council 's in ten t to hold the contr ibut ion r a t e to the "pension" plan a t the 1( 
l e v e l s (6.65% of s a l a r y for employee; approximate ly 4.9% for employei 
regardless of ant ic ipa ted r i s e in contr ibut ion r a t e s of cor responding fedei 
soc ia l secur i ty program. 
A 5 * 
WEST JORDAN 
A Municipal Corporation 
RESOLUTION 81-199 
A RESOLUTION DECLARING THE CITY 
COUNCIL'S INTENT CONCERNING 
BENEFITS IN LIEU OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
Whereas, the City Council has withdrawn City employees from coverage under 
the Federal Social Security Act; and 
Whereas, the law requires the City to provide substitute benefits for such 
employees in lieu of coverage under the Act; and 
Whereas, the City has provided such benefits; and 
Whereas, the City Council desires to express its intent on the providing of 
such benefits, 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH: 
Section 1. The City Council expresses its intent in providing 
substitute benefits in lieu of the coverage under the Social 
Security Act to be as follows: 
That those benefits provided shall be provided at a cost 
to the City not to exceed 6-65% of the employee's salary 
or wages. This figure is to be fixed and shall not 
vary regardless of the percentage which might be required 
to be contributed by private employers covered under the 
Social Security Act. It is the City Council's intent not 
to amend or to raise this percentage figure regardless of 
such changes in the federal statute, unless and until the 
benefit package awarded to covered employees under the 
Social Security Act is significantly raised so as to be 
disproportionate to the benefit package to which City 
employees are entitled at the 6.65% cost to the City. 
Section 2. This resolution shall take effect immediately. 
Adopted by the City Council of West Jordan this 1st day of Deceniber , 1981 
isi**^ji— / y . \k^JxJ^^A^-t^ 
Burton, Mayor 
ATTEST: ft C4 
ADDENDA 
#10 Photocopies of checks showing child support 
payments made by Defendant 
EXHIBIT #8 A55-A59 
g g ^ 
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PURCHASER'S RECEIPT 
±S> ^.\*,ULJS^T PERSONAL.HONEYORDER _ 
PO, M I J « l W t I T JOWOAM. Vt*M •*©< 
PaytiMr To "YJIWA ^T&u/>caff-
97-105/1243 
m 49772 
7 ' 2i2-
T f r M s W u f in buying this persona 
money order form with the number anc 
•mount shown hereon agrees to inser 
in ink the date, the payee, his owr 
signature and address and assumes re 
sponsiDility tor ail events made pos 
stte by h« tJMure to do so. 
=£*£! 
I -—«*- ...- «- ^ ~ PURCHASER'S RECEIPT 
I ^SP^DRAPER^?/ ™ 
|| ( M A X ) <r..lA«iJ_-^-LtfT* PERSONAL MOXEYORDEk 
T>ateiL 
= 0 ^ 
97-105/1243 
/W/M- /» "WNv/ft M Tilu/ocoft-
£a N2 49773 
•2oa 0° er in buying this person? 
money order lorm with the number an 
amount shown hereon agrees to inse 
in ink the date, the payee, his ow 
signature and address and assumes re 
soonsibility for ail events made pos 
_w._ _ _ • ooso. 
TIABLE 
=£&Z 
= * ^ 
PURCHASER'S RECEIPT 
^DRAPER^LJ 
97-105/1243 
FOR 
PERSOXAL MONEY ORDER w 
PtrtahU To \AlkVh M TToJZoo-
T>aretf.Y> G / U o X V ^ B ^ N2 0 5 1 7 9 1 ' 
The 
OO 
buying thts person; 
money order lorm with the number an 
amount shown hereon agrees to mse 
in ink the date, the payee, his ow 
signature and address and assumes n 
soonsibility for all events made por 
z=£&Z 
ieVe^SifcV^W/^^hV'yi^^liiiJii-'.. ' ' ' ^ / / i ' u ' J ' . 1 ^ ^ 
=Q^g 
^ORAPER^J 
& T J £T T R U S T ^_JWl*/ 
PURCHASER'S RECEIPT 
FOR 
PERSONAL MONJ-X ORDER 
PuyubU To 
97-105/1243 
N2 051792 
ZQQ— 
ThfftihfOT-*r in buying this person, 
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ADDENDA 
#11 Table showing expenditures by Defendant 
(offered, not admitted) 
EXHIBIT #23 A60 
Kathe Homer vs Stephen Homer 
Civil No. CV 87 2098 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT # Z3 
Family .y "income" 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Total 
(less C/S pa 
$ 12,163 
$ 33,814 
$ 35,000 
$ 36,335 
$ 31,891 
$ 35,542 
$184,745 
$184,745 x 40% [Kathe1s answer to Interrogatories] = $73,898 expended on Ben and 
Peter during period 1980 through 1985 
Kathe working only September 1985 through December 1985 
1986 and 1987 (to separation of parties in September) not counted as KCH then 
working (1986 only part-time) 
^DEFENDANT'S^ 
Af.A 
ADDENDA 
#12 Excerpts from trial testimony of Kathe Homer 
TRANSCRIPT pp. 59-61 A61-A63 
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You say you're paying child care of $140 a month? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To whom are you paying that? 
A. Well, to my neighbor who takes care of 
Melissa. 
Q. What is her name? 
A. Andrea Cranny and to baby-sitters. 
I mean Andrea takes care of her or has at 
different times. She goes off track. She has her 
holidays at Christmas and whatever that she goes for a 
long time. And during the school year I normally have 
Andrea. Or this year it's been Andrea or Mary 
Arnoldson. One of the women in the neighborhood take 
care of Melissa. It's for shorter periods of time. 
Then I have a girl in the neighborhood, a teenager. 
Q. So essentially you need child care for 
about three months out of the year during the period of 
time — 
A. Plus the month in the summer when she is 
off. 
Q. Well — 
A. Plus the two weeks. I mean if you have got 
three weeks, three weeks plus four weeks in the summer 
plus all the other vacations. There is a lot of time. 
The other thing is I worked every other Saturday, tkl^l 
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Q. Just a second. Are you telling me, this 
Court that in the year-round school that the children 
are out of school more than — 
A. They are out of school the whole month of 
July and they are out of school nine weeks during the 
school year plus Christmas and whatever. 
But in our particular system they are out 
all of July. It's not really rear-round. 
It's like extended year or something. 
Q. They are still required to attend school 
the same number of years that the regular children are, 
are they not? 
A. I assume so. But I just know when she is 
home. I mean you can look that up. 
Q. There are about three months that she is 
out of school? 
A. I assume so. I mean whatever it is. 
Q. And it's during those three months that you 
pay child care? 
A. No. I paid child care other times also. 
I'm not home. And the other thing is 
working at the library I'm required to work evenings and 
every other Saturday which he knows that she has to have 
a baby-sitter at that time also. 
Q. You have receipts for these child care 
A 
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payments? 
A. No I don't. 
Q. Do you pay with check or with cash? 
A. Sometimes. Sometimes I pay with cash if I 
have cash or if it's a younger baby-sitter because I 
think that's easier for them. 
Q. Alright. $140 is just an estimate. 
A. Well, what I did was add up all the hours 
that I am gone when she is home and then try to figure 
out how much I paid, I mean how much it would be. 
Q. But you don't always have — 
A. I don't keep track. 
Q. And you do not always have your 
eight-year-old with the baby-sitter. Sometimes she is 
home alone; isn't that true? 
A. Not very often. 
Q. But it is true sometimes? 
A. It is true although I don't agree with that 
at all. So it's not very often at all. And if Andrea 
weren't my neighbor it wouldn't be at all. 
Q. Now have you paid Mr. Johnson some 
attorney's fees at this point? 
A. In the beginning I paid him some attorneys 
fees. 
Q. How much did you pay? Ma 
ADDENDA 
#13 Excerpts from trial testimony of Randy Marchant 
TRANSCRIPT pp. 86-91 A64-A69 
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THE COURT: Would be for the year '84 and '85? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
And with that we would rest. 
THE COURT: Any objection to the admission of 
Exhibit 7? 
MR. YOUNG: With those changes? 
THE COURT: Those changes for zero for '84 and 
$1,650 for *85? 
MR. YOUNG: No. 
THE COURT: Very well then. 7 is received. 
Alright, Mr. Young? 
MR. YOUNG: I will call Mr. Randy Marchant. 
THE COURT: Very well. If you will come forward 
the clerk will administer an oath to you. 
(Witness sworn.) 
THE COURT: Be seated here in the witness chair. 
RANDY MARCHANT, 
called as a witness herein, after having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
Q. 
A. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Would you tell us your name please? 
Randy Marchant. ft UL 
87 
1 Q. Which city do you reside? 
2 A. Provo. 
3 Q. How are you employed? 
4 A. I am the district manager for the social 
5 security administration here in Provo. 
6 Q. Tell me just very briefly about your 
7 educational background. 
8 A. I have a bachelors degree from Weber State 
9 College. 
10 Q. Alright. 
11 And how long have you been working for the 
12 Department of Human Services Social Security? 
13 A. About 13 and a half years. 
14 Q. You're here pursuant to a subpoena? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Now are you acquainted with the windfall 
17 elimination program? 
18 A. I am. 
19 Q. Can you tell us briefly what it means? 
20 If I mayf let me present to you that I 
21 wrote Mr. Homer and Mr. Homer — The evidence will be 
22 that he has been employed by a governmental entity which 
23 participated in social security. He had social security 
24 withholding and now he doesnft. And now he works for 
25 Jordan City and they have opted out. A be; 
88 
1 Can you tell us the consequences 
2 conceptually, the conceptual consequences to him of his 
3 receiving social security down the road and how that 
4 will impact or how his retirement may impact his receipt 
5 of the social security benefit? 
6 A. Yes* There have been basically two public 
7 laws passed in the last five yearsf the intention of 
8 which was to reduce to public employees who would 
9 receive social security benefit, the level that they 
10 would receive because of the public pensions, the idea 
11 being that social security is involved with some income 
12 redistribution, that that was intended for the poor 
13 rather than those who would have other pensions* 
14 So the receipt of another pension does 
15 reduce social security benefits. If you want me to take 
16 about three or four minutes I can give you a real brief 
17 idea of what's involved. 
18 Q. Why don't you do that. 
19 A. To understand the windfall elimination 
20 provision which is actually a fairly simple provision a 
21 person needs to have just a real brief understanding how 
22 social security is computed. Basically a person's 
23 lifetime earnings are used starting at age 21 and up 
24 through age 61 except that the lowest five are dropped 
25 off and then an average monthly wage is determined from 
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those remaining earnings. That average monthly wage 
becomes a very important figure because that's where the 
income redistribution and the actual computation occurs. 
For example I did note down here 1989 this 
somebody retiring. The computation is fixed. 
They get a certain percentage of what we 
call bend points. In this case the person without 
windfall elimination gets 90 percent of the first $339. 
That constitutes their average monthly 
earnings and then if you have that, it's reduced. I 
have something hear that tells me. I don't have it 
right here in front of me, but they get a much lesser 
amount of the amount that's over $339. The real effect 
of the windfall elimination provision is that the person 
that's fully covered by that would get only 40 percent 
of that first $339. In other words, a person that was 
actually affected by this that year would lose about 
$170, I guess $169.50 each month in benefits. 
Q. Now is the reason for that the assumption 
that they are being able to draw upon the retirement 
money that's already put away for them, the benefit? 
A. Yes. That's part of the reason, you know, 
politically speaking when there's a loss, past social 
security trust was in trouble and I think that the 
realization was that there was another pension involved 
COJS 
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so that they were gonna try to avoid double diping if 
you would. 
Q. Alright. So with respect to Mr. Homer/ 
because he's about 40, 41, 42, it would be — you just 
couldn't tell in terms of actual dollars without knowing 
a person's history about how much they're gonna be — 
A. Yes. In fact there are even some things 
that make it tougher than that. The idea behind these 
points and bend points and computations is to keep a 
return on an investment that is stable. So that means 
social security's computation number methods actually 
change from year to year somewhat. And obviously he's 
young enough that future projections or lack of future 
social security earnings would also have an effect. 
Q. So we can fairly conclude then that because 
of his participation in a retirement program that has 
replaced social security, when the time comes for him to 
be paid, the social security allotment to which he would 
be entitled will be reduced by some amount? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. That's all I have. 
May a spouse of a participant, a divorced 
spouse of a participant receive social security benefit? 
A. If the marriage has lasted for ten years or 
more. AfaSl 
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MR. YOUNG: Alright. Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Cross-examine? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JOHNSON: 
Q. Just a couple. 
Isn't there a maximum social security 
monthly benefit that you can receive? 
A. Theoretically there's not. 
I guess in reality there probably is. 
Q. That is because of these bend points that 
you used and the percentages you get to a point where no 
matter how much you make you're not gonna get over X 
dollars, correct? 
A. Yes because you would hit maximum paid in 
each year. 
Q. Do you know what that is like this year? 
A. Not off the top of my head for this year. 
I think I have it here for a couple years 
back. Excuse me. I don't see it here. My experience 
is that that's probably within $30, $40 of $900 a month. 
Q. $900? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, in essence as I look at what you're 
saying, and I think I have had you on the stand several 
PrteR 
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#14 Excerpts from trial testimony of Linda Homer 
TRANSCRIPT pp. 165-166 A70-A72 
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THE COURT: If you will come forward please the 
clerk will administer an oath to you. 
(Witness sworn.) 
THE COURT: Be seated here in the witness 
chair. 
LINDA HOMER, 
called as a witness herein, after having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
City. 
Q. Would you tell us your name please? 
A. Linda Homer. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. 3364 West Sunnybrook Drive, West Valley 
Q. How are you related to Steve? 
A. I'm his sister-in-law. 
Q. You married his brother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I direct your attention to August of '74, 
the Brighton family reunion. Do you recall that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to talk with 
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Mrs. Kathy Homer at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she talk about — Well, tell me. Did 
she talk about the separation of the parties, the 
separation of her and her husband or her divorce? 
A. I don't know if she mentioned divorce 
specifically. She told me at that time that she was 
planning on staying with Stephen until Melissa was in 
school. 
MR. YOONG: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. JOHNSON: We would object and ask it be 
stricken. 
THE COURT: I will permit it to remain. 
Do you have any cross-examination? 
MR. JOHNSON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JOHNSON: 
Q. May I just ask one question? 
Did you ever communicate that to Steve? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. You didn't tell him? 
A. Not that I remember. 
THE COURT: Any objection if she remains? 
— — f\ A I 
Kathe Homer vs Stephen Homer 
Civil NO. CV 87 2098 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT # Zl 
Family "income" (less C/S paid by SGH to WTH) 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Total 
$ 12,163 
$ 33,814 
$ 35,000 
$ 36,335 
$ 31,891 
$ 35,542 
$184,745 
$184,745 x 40% [Kathe's answer to Interrogatories] = $73,898 expended on Ben and 
Peter during period 1980 through 1985 
Kathe working only September 1985 through December 1985 
1986 and 1987 (to separation of parties in September) not counted as KCH then 
working (1986 only part-time) 
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